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SELLING ADVICE AND CREATING EXPECTATIONS:
WHY BROKERS SHOULD BE FIDUCIARIES
Arthur B. Laby*
Abstract: Investors face a dizzying array of choices regarding where to invest their funds
and increasingly rely on experts for advice. Most advice about securities is provided by
investment advisers or broker-dealers, legal categories with little meaning to most people but
fraught with consequences. Although advisers and brokers often perform the same function,
advisers are subject to a strict fiduciary standard to act in their clients’ best interest while
brokers are subject to a less rigorous standard of suitability to ensure that their
recommendations are suitable for customers. In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act authorized the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to harmonize the regulation of advisers and
brokers and impose a fiduciary duty on brokers that give advice. This Article is about
whether the SEC should exercise its authority. After explaining the historical context of the
debate over a fiduciary standard, the Article critiques common arguments for a fiduciary
duty, concluding that they are incomplete and do not alone justify a change in the law. The
Article then puts forth a better justification, based on the reasonable expectations of
investors. Reasonable expectations arise from brokers marketing their services as advisory
and using titles, such as financial advisor and financial consultant. Reasonable expectations
provide a stronger justification for a fiduciary standard than the conventional arguments.
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INTRODUCTION
Consider an individual who, with a modest amount of money to
invest, visits a financial services professional to decide where to place
the funds. The investor will face a dizzying array of choices and must
decide among stocks, bonds, mutual funds, annuities, commodities,
insurance policies, and other investment products. Because most people
are unable to make investment decisions on their own, the individual
will likely turn to the professional sitting across the desk for help. The
professional’s legal status under the federal securities laws will be of
little importance to the investor. “Just tell me what to do,” is his likely
sentiment.
The professional across the desk is typically a representative of either
a broker-dealer or an investment adviser—legal forms that are
meaningless to most people but fraught with consequences. A brokerdealer engages in numerous activities, such as executing trades, selling

Laby - FINAL Word.docx (Do Not Delete)

710

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

11/1/2012 11:20 AM

[Vol. 87:707

securities, lending money to investors to invest on margin, maintaining
custody of funds and securities, and advising about investment
decisions.1 When recommending securities, a broker-dealer owes a duty
of suitability, which is a duty to ensure that an investment
recommendation or strategy is suitable for a particular individual at a
particular time.2 An investment adviser, by contrast, engages primarily
in advisory activities, including portfolio selection, asset allocation,
portfolio management, selecting and monitoring other advisers, and
financial planning.3 An adviser owes a fiduciary duty to act in an
investor’s best interest, which includes a duty to avoid, or at least to
disclose, material conflicts of interest.4
There is a significant difference between a suitability standard and a
fiduciary standard of conduct.5 Assume the investor in the example
above would like to buy shares of a mutual fund that focuses on global
technology companies. Assume further that the professional advising the
investor is aware of six similar global technology funds with nearly
identical performance, each of which is suitable for the investor. If the
professional is a representative of a broker-dealer, he could consider any
number of factors when deciding which fund to recommend, including
the broker’s own compensation from the transaction. By contrast, if the
professional is an investment adviser representative, he would be
required to determine which of the six funds is in the best interest of the
investor, taking into account which of the funds has the lowest overall
fees and costs. Thus, although the investor is unlikely to think twice
about legal categories, such as broker-dealer and investment adviser,6
the differences between them have important consequences.7
1. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N STAFF, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS
REQUIRED BY SECTION 913 OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT 10 (2011) [hereinafter SECTION 913 STUDY].
AS

2. See infra Part I.C.
3. SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 1, at 6–7.
4. See infra Part I.C.
5. See infra Part I.C.
6. In this Article, I generally use “e” when referring to advisers, consistent with the Investment
Advisers Act, unless referring to broker-dealers or their registered representatives, which often refer
to themselves as advisors, using “o” not “e.” See Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b–
2(a)(11) (2006).
7. See Donald C. Langevoort, Brokers as Fiduciaries, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 439, 445 (2010)
(explaining that a broker can recommend a high-load mutual fund without revealing the existence of
a less costly comparable product). There is abundant evidence that lower fees enhance returns. See,
e.g., Mark M. Carhart, On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 52 J. FIN. 57, 80 (1997)
(“[E]xpense ratios, portfolio turnover, and load fees are significantly and negatively related to
performance.”); D. K. Malhotra & Robert W. McLeod, An Empirical Analysis of Mutual Fund
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An outside observer might be mystified by the disparate regulation of
broker-dealers and investment advisers when both provide advice to
retail customers about securities. This state of affairs did not arise
overnight.8 For many years the line separating broker-dealers and
investment advisers has blurred, and brokers have moved into territory
traditionally occupied by advisers. The U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC or Commission) attempted to address this move
through an administrative rule proposed in 19999 and adopted in 2005.10
However, the Financial Planning Association (FPA) successfully
challenged that rule in Financial Planning Ass’n v. SEC,11 reigniting
confusion regarding the responsibilities of broker-dealers and investment
advisers and the proper regulatory treatment of brokers that give
advice.12
Before the SEC was able to prepare a new rule, the financial crisis of
2008 overtook events, and the Obama Administration embraced the
regulation of broker-dealers and investment advisers as one plank in its
financial regulatory reform agenda.13 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act)
addressed the regulation of brokers and advisers but did not resolve the
issue definitively.14 In the Dodd-Frank Act, the U.S. Congress required
Expenses, 20 J. FIN. RES. 175, 189 (1997) (concluding that investors should select no-load funds
with no 12b-1 plan); see also Calculating Mutual Fund Fees and Expenses, SEC,
http://www.sec.gov/investor/tools/mfcc/mfcc-int.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2012).
8. See Certain Broker-Dealers Not Deemed to Be Investment Advisers, Exchange Act Release
No. 42099, Advisers Act Release No. 1845, 64 Fed. Reg. 61226, 61227 (proposed Nov. 4, 1999)
[hereinafter 1999 Proposing Release]; see also Barbara Black, Brokers and Advisers – What’s in a
Name?, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 31, 34 (2005); Financial Advisers Group Sues SEC Over
Broker-Dealer Exemption, 10 NO. 20 ANDREWS DERIVATIVES LITIG. REP. 10 (Aug. 20, 2004).
9. 1999 Proposing Release, supra note 8. As discussed below, this proposal was intended to
exclude broker-dealers from application of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, not to place a
fiduciary duty on brokers that give advice to retail customers. See infra Part I.E.
10. Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not to Be Investment Advisers, Exchange Act Release No.
51523, Advisers Act Release No. 2376, 70 Fed. Reg. 20424 (Apr. 12, 2005) [hereinafter Adopting
Release].
11. 482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The Financial Planning Association is a membership
organization for personal financial planning experts. Who We Are, FIN. PLANNING ASS’N,
http://www.fpanet.org/AboutFPA/WhoWeAre/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2012).
12. Interpretive Rule Under the Advisers Act Affecting Broker-Dealers, Advisers Act Release
No. 2652, 72 Fed. Reg. 55126, 55127 (proposed Sept. 24, 2007).
13. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION
AND REGULATION 71 (2009) [hereinafter TREASURY WHITE PAPER], available at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf.
14. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31, and 41 U.S.C.
(Supp. IV 2010)) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].

Laby - FINAL Word.docx (Do Not Delete)

712

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

11/1/2012 11:20 AM

[Vol. 87:707

the SEC to conduct a study (the Section 913 Study) on whether to
harmonize the regulation of brokers and advisers and authorized the
Commission to impose a fiduciary duty on broker-dealers when
providing personalized advice about securities to retail customers.15 This
Article is about whether the SEC should exercise its authority to impose
a fiduciary duty.
The issue of regulatory harmonization is highly charged. In January
2011, the five-member Commission itself split on whether to release the
Section 913 Study.16 Since the publication of the Study, lobbying in
Washington on this matter has been intense. Advisers generally line up
in favor of a fiduciary obligation for brokers.17 Broker-dealers, by
contrast, either provide tepid support or oppose a fiduciary standard
altogether.18 The decision over whether to impose a fiduciary duty on

15. Id. § 913; see SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 1, at i–ii.
16. See Kathleen L. Casey & Troy A. Paredes, Comm’rs, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement
Regarding Study On Investment Advisers And Broker-Dealers (Jan. 21, 2011) (transcript available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch012211klctap.htm).
17. The Financial Planning Coalition, for example, has campaigned actively for a fiduciary
standard. The Coalition was formed to advocate on issues related to financial planners, and it is
composed of the Financial Planning Association, the Certified Financial Planner Board of Standard,
Inc., and the National Association of Personal Financial Advisors. Another informal coalition,
composed of seven groups in favor of the fiduciary standard, has advocated for harmonization
through comment letters and other activities. The groups are Consumer Federation of America,
Fund Democracy, AARP, Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards, Inc., Financial Planning
Association, Investment Adviser Association, and National Association of Personal Financial
Advisors. Letter from Barbara Roper, Dir. of Investor Protection, Consumer Fed’n of Am., et al., to
Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (March 28, 2012). Two other
organizations, the Committee for the Fiduciary Standard and the Institute for the Fiduciary
Standard, are both urging Congress to impose a fiduciary obligation on brokers. See About Us,
COMMITTEE FOR FIDUCIARY STANDARD, http://www.thefiduciarystandard.org/about-us (last visited
Sept. 9, 2012); Why an Institute for the Fiduciary Standard?, INST. FOR FIDUCIARY STANDARD,
http://www.thefiduciaryinstitute.org/about/why-an-institute (last visited Sept. 9, 2012).
18. The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) has stated that it
supports a fiduciary standard but opposes a fiduciary obligation of the variety now applied to
investment advisers. Letter from Ira D. Hammerman, Senior Man. Dir. and Gen. Counsel, SIFMA,
to Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 4 (July 14, 2011) [hereinafter SIFMA
Framework Letter]. SIFMA is a trade association for broker-dealer firms. Insurance industry
representatives, many of whom are also licensed as securities brokers, have voiced strong
opposition to a fiduciary duty. The National Association of Insurance and Financial Advisors
(NAIFA), a trade group for the insurance industry, has argued that a fiduciary standard will increase
costs and that there is no evidence it will provide investors with additional protection. See Press
Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. & Fin. Advisors, NAIFA President Terry K. Headley Says Suitability
Standard of Care Serves Consumers with ‘Rules-Based, Objective’ Approach (May 11, 2011),
available at http://www.naifa.org/newsevents/releases/20110511_rulesbased.cfm; see also Tara
Siegel Bernard, Struggling Over a Rule for Brokers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/16/business/16adviser.html?pagewanted=all.
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brokers has engendered discussion in academia as well.19 Writers have
discussed reasons to place a fiduciary duty on brokers, but they have not
systematically analyzed the merits of the arguments used to support a
fiduciary standard. This Article fills that gap. It assesses the arguments
in support of a fiduciary duty, concluding that although some have merit,
they do not by themselves justify a change.
Although a fiduciary duty for brokers is warranted, it is not warranted
for the reasons generally expressed. Instead, a fiduciary obligation
should be imposed on brokers that give advice based on investors’
reasonable expectations. Reasonable expectations are not the same as
empirical expectations based on survey data or other inquiries into
epistemic expectations. Reasonable expectations are based not only on
actual expectations, but also on normative considerations that ground a
right. Through advertising and titles, broker-dealers hold themselves out
as purveyors of impartial advice, which gives rise to reasonable
expectations that they will act in a fiduciary capacity. The primary thrust
of this Article is that these actions broadly support imposing a fiduciary
standard. The point is not that individual brokers through advertising or
use of titles have created individualized fiduciary contracts with
particular investors. Rather, it is the way the industry holds itself out
broadly that creates reasonable expectations that brokers giving advice
will act in a fiduciary capacity. These reasonable expectations provide a
justification for imposing a federal fiduciary duty.
Part I of this Article provides historical background regarding the
debate over whether to impose a fiduciary duty on brokers. The debate

19. A small body of literature has developed, fueled by the court’s opinion in Financial Planning
Ass’n and the Administration’s decision to press for harmonization in financial regulatory reform.
See generally Matthew P. Allen, A Lesson from History, Roosevelt to Obama – The Evolution of
Broker-Dealer Regulation: From Self-Regulation, Arbitration, and Suitability to Federal
Regulation, Litigation, and Fiduciary Duty, 5 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 1 (2010); Onnig H.
Dombalagian, Investment Recommendations and the Essence of Duty, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1265
(2011); Kristina A. Fausti, A Fiduciary Duty For All?, 12 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 183 (2010); Thomas Lee
Hazen, Stock Broker Fiduciary Duties and the Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act, 15 N.C. BANKING
INST. 47 (2011); Thomas Lee Hazen, Are Existing Stock Broker Standards Sufficient? Principles,
Rules, and Fiduciary Duties, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 710 (2010); Steven D. Irwin, Scott A.
Lane & Carolyn W. Mendelson, Wasn’t My Broker Always Looking Out For My Best Interests? The
Road to Become a Fiduciary, 12 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 41 (2009); Arthur B. Laby, Reforming the
Regulation of Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers, 65 BUS. LAW. 395 (2010); Langevoort,
supra note 7; Nicholas S. Di Lorenzo, Note, Defining a New Punctilio of an Honor: The Best
Interest Standard for Broker-Dealers, 92 B.U. L. REV. 291 (2012); Symposium, Papers on a
Fiduciary Duty for Broker-Dealers, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. LAW. 119 (2010); Robert A. Prentice,
Moral Equilibrium: Stock Brokers and the Limits of Disclosure, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 1059 (2011);
Gary A. Varnavides, The Flawed State of Broker-Dealer Regulation and the Case for an Authentic
Federal Fiduciary Standard for Broker-Dealers, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 203 (2011).
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has a long history, starting with decisions made when the federal
securities laws were passed in the 1930s and in 1940, and through
developments in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. This history explains why
different standards are imposed on broker-dealers and investment
advisers. Part I also demonstrates that concerns animating the debate
today are surprisingly similar to concerns that were prevalent when the
securities laws were enacted. The concern today is that broker-dealers,
which historically sold securities and profited when a sale was made,
have assumed a role that causes investors to believe that brokers provide
impartial advice. Brokers, therefore, should be regulated as advisers. In
the 1930s, there was a similar concern that brokers with a product to sell
could disguise themselves as impartial advisers. Regulation was urged as
a means to separate the two groups. Understanding this parallel provides
historical context to the modern debate over harmonization.
Part II reviews and analyzes arguments put forth by advocates for a
fiduciary standard. Although some of the claims overlap, the arguments
can be delineated as follows: (i) investors are confused about the
standards imposed on brokers and advisers, (ii) the standards currently
imposed on brokers and advisers are inconsistent, (iii) the standards
currently imposed on brokers are ineffective, (iv) the benefits of
imposing a fiduciary standard on brokers outweigh the costs, and (v)
investors expect a fiduciary standard for brokers. The first four
arguments do not, by themselves, support a fiduciary standard; the last
argument, investor expectations, comes closest to providing a sound
justification, but it is not cast in a compelling manner. Thus, none of the
conventional arguments provides a sufficient justification to adopt a
fiduciary standard.
Part III extends and develops the last of the five arguments discussed
in Part II, investor expectations, and asserts that reasonable expectations
provide a more compelling justification for change than actual
expectations. Part III begins by reviewing three possible foundations for
reasonable expectations: the contract terms, empirical expectations, and
normative expectations. Part III then explains that advertisements and
titles emphasizing advice used by many broker-dealers induce investors
to engage brokerage firms to do business. This inducement provides a
normative foundation for a reasonable expectation that brokers will be
providing advice. Part III then demonstrates that a reasonable
expectation that a broker will give advice is tantamount to a reasonable
expectation that the broker will act in a fiduciary capacity. Part III
concludes by discussing the implications of reasonable expectations
under both regulatory and common law.
The need to articulate a justification for a fiduciary standard is

Laby - FINAL Word.docx (Do Not Delete)

2012]

11/1/2012 11:20 AM

SELLING ADVICE AND CREATING EXPECTATIONS

715

timely.20 There is a definite trend toward the adoption of a fiduciary duty
for brokers. This trend is evidenced by the following measures: the
Obama Administration’s inclusion of a fiduciary standard in its 2008 and
2009 reform agendas,21 Congressional action in the Dodd-Frank Act
authorizing the SEC to impose a fiduciary duty on broker-dealers,22 the
Section 913 Study, which recommended the adoption of a fiduciary
rule,23 and statements from SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro in support of
a fiduciary obligation.24 The Securities Industry and Financial Markets
Association (SIFMA), the trade association for broker-dealers, has also
agreed that a fiduciary duty should be adopted in some form.25 Most
recently, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), the selfregulatory organization (SRO) for brokers, suggested that the suitability
requirement entails making recommendations that are consistent with a
customer’s best interest—a fiduciary standard—and offered guidance on
fulfilling such a fiduciary responsibility.26 Although all roads point to the
adoption of a fiduciary standard for brokers that give advice, the SEC
has not yet acted. As a result, a sound justification for a fiduciary
obligation is more important than ever.

20. See, e.g., Tara Siegel Bernard, A Fancy Financial Adviser Title Does Not Ensure High
Standards, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2012, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/07/yourmoney/beware-of-fancy-financial-adviser-titles.html; Susanne Craig & Jessica Silver-Greenberg,
Former Brokers Say JPMorgan Favored Selling Bank’s Own Funds Over Others, N.Y. TIMES, July
2, 2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/02/ex-brokers-say-jpmorgan-favored-selling-banksown-funds-over-others; Susanne Craig & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Many Regulators Put Their
Attention on How JPMorgan Marketed its Funds, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2012,
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/11/jpmorgan-pushed-sales-of-its-funds-even-at-clientsexpense-brokers-say; Editorial, Want to Buy a Mutual Fund?, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2012, at A22,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/04/opinion/want-to-buy-a-mutual-fund.html.
21. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY
STRUCTURE 121, 125–26 (2008) [hereinafter TREASURY BLUEPRINT], available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp896.aspx; TREASURY WHITE PAPER,
supra note 13, at 15, 71–72.
22. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 14, § 913.
23. SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 1, at 109.
24. Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the CCOutreach
National Seminar (Feb. 8, 2011) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/
spch020811mls.htm).
25. SIFMA Framework Letter, supra note 18, at 11.
26. FINRA, Regulatory Notice 12-25, at 3–4 (May 2012), available at http://www.finra.org/
web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p126431.pdf.

Laby - FINAL Word.docx (Do Not Delete)

716
I.

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

11/1/2012 11:20 AM

[Vol. 87:707

DISPARATE REGULATION OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS
AND BROKER-DEALERS THAT PROVIDE ADVICE IS
ROOTED IN HISTORY

The debate over whether to place a fiduciary duty on broker-dealers
that provide advice is rooted in the 1930s, when Congress first imposed
federal regulation on the securities industry. Certain regulatory decisions
from seventy-five years ago, understandably, have not withstood the test
of time. This Part discusses the advent of the regulation of brokerdealers and investment advisers and explains historical shifts that have
led to the dilemma over brokers’ obligations.
A.

Early State Regulation of Brokers and Advisers Was Minimal

Before the 1930s, there was little federal regulation of the securities
industry. The Interstate Commerce Commission exercised some
regulation over common carriers’ issuance of securities, but investor
protection regulation, if it existed at all, was generally done at the state
level.27 States regulated the securities industry in three ways.28 One type
of regulation was securities registration or licensing, whereby securities
sold to the public had to be registered with a state authority. A second
type of regulation was registration and licensing of persons engaged in
the securities business. A third type was anti-fraud regulation, whereby
state authorities investigated and prosecuted individuals or firms that
caused injury to state residents when marketing, selling, or advising
about securities.29 State securities laws were known as “blue sky” laws.
Blue sky laws permitted scrutiny over the merits of an investment as
opposed to merely requiring disclosure of relevant information.30
During this early era, broker-dealers and investment advisers were
subject to state regulation.31 In 1911, Kansas was the first state to pass a
state securities law, which included a licensing requirement applicable to
persons in the securities business.32 Over the next two years, twentythree states followed by enacting some form of securities regulation.33
27. See RALPH F. DE BEDTS, THE NEW DEAL’S SEC: THE FORMATIVE YEARS 3–4 (1964).
28. LOUIS LOSS & EDWARD M. COWETT, BLUE SKY LAW 19 (1958).
29. Id.
30. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 306 (6th ed. 2009).
31. See generally H.R. DOC. NO. 76-477, at 57–64 (1939) (advisers); JOHN M. ELLIOTT, THE
ANNOTATED BLUE SKY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (1919) (brokers); ROBERT R. REED &
LESTER H. WASHBURN, BLUE SKY LAWS: ANALYSIS AND TEXT (1921) (brokers).
32. LOSS & COWETT, supra note 28, at 7.
33. Id. at 10.
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Although some states, like Kansas, required registration of securities or
market professionals, the Investment Bankers Association (IBA), a trade
association for the securities industry, prevented registration in the states
that mattered most.34 In New York, for example, the IBA encouraged the
state legislature to pass the Martin Act, which gave the Attorney General
authority to investigate and prosecute fraud in the sale of securities,
though registration was not required. Working with the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE), the IBA resisted efforts to register broker-dealers in
New York until 1932, well after the onset of the Great Depression.35
During this period, there was even less regulation of investment
advisers than broker-dealers. Before World War I, investment advice
was typically provided by lawyers, banks, trust companies, brokers, and
dealers, but not by dedicated investment advisory professionals.36 After
the stock market crash of 1929, there was greater demand for advice as
investors sought to avoid the trauma of another Great Crash. As a result,
the dedicated profession of investment counsel (as it was once called)
developed more rapidly during the 1930s than during previous
decades.37 Still, even by the late 1930s, only seven states, including
California, Connecticut, and Illinois, required adviser registration.38
Some, such as Michigan and Rhode Island, included within the term
“broker” or “dealer” any person who acted as investment counsel and
advised on the purchase or sale of securities. Consequently, many
individuals giving advice were regulated because they were considered
brokers or dealers, not due to intentional regulation of advisers.39
State regulation during this early period was limited in both scope and
effectiveness. In 1933, only eight states had a dedicated securities
commission. In most cases, securities administrators were overworked
and underpaid bank, insurance, audit, or railroad superintendents. Many
were short-term political appointees who lacked relevant expertise.
Moreover, many securities offerings occurred interstate, allowing the
parties to avoid regulation if the transaction closed in a non-blue sky
state. Interstate offerings provided perhaps the greatest impediment to
effective state regulation at the time.40 The advent of a national securities
market called for national regulation, and the Great Depression was the
34. MICHAEL E. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL 21–22 (1970).
35. Id. at 22.
36. H.R. DOC. NO. 76-477, at 3 (1939).
37. Id. at 5.
38. Id. at 31–32.
39. Id. at 32–33.
40. PARRISH, supra note 34, at 28–29.
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impetus for reform.
B.

Federal Securities Regulation Was First Enacted During the Great
Depression

After the Great Crash of 1929, the securities markets were moribund.
For President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, federal securities legislation
was necessary as a moral matter as well as an economic one.41 The first
comprehensive federal law to regulate the securities industry was the
Securities Act of 1933, known as the Truth in Securities Act and passed
by Congress as part of FDR’s First Hundred Days.42 The fabled authors
of the Securities Act, Tommy Corcoran, William Landis, and Ben
Cohen—protégés of Felix Frankfurter—rejected merit-based regulation
and opted instead for a philosophy of full disclosure modeled on the
English Companies Act. The Securities Act required companies offering
and selling securities to the public to make detailed disclosures and
register offerings with the Federal Trade Commission, which would
initially administer the law.43 The Securities Act was signed into law on
May 27, 1933, and federal regulation of the securities industry was
born.44 Although the Securities Act regulated broker-dealers in their
securities underwriting capacity,45 it did not impose comprehensive
regulation on brokers, and it imposed no regulation on advisers.
1.

Broker-Dealer Regulation Was Enacted in 1934

Broker-dealers were first subject to detailed federal regulation in the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. After the Securities Act was enacted,
reformers turned their attention from the primary market, where issuers
sell securities to raise capital, to trading in the so-called secondary
market, where securities are traded among investors. Passage of the
Exchange Act was far more challenging than the Securities Act.
Regulating the secondary market required oversight of the powerful
41. Id. at 43.
42. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa
(2006)).
43. ANTHONY J. BADGER, FDR: THE FIRST HUNDRED DAYS 130–31 (2008).
44. The Landis-Cohen Bill passed easily in the House. The Senate, however, passed a different
version. Sam Rayburn, the powerful chairman of the House Interstate Commerce Committee,
favored the House version. He secured the support of FDR as well as Senate Majority Leader
Joseph Robinson, and the House version prevailed in the Senate. See id. at 132.
45. Securities Act of 1933, ch.38, § 2(11), 48 Stat. 74, 75 (1933) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006)) (defining underwriter); id. § 11(a)(5), 48 Stat. at 82 (establishing
underwriter liability).
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exchanges and broker-dealer firms. Moreover, although the Securities
Act passed with relative ease, the legislative environment had changed
by 1934. The air of crisis had evaporated, and the legislative pace had
slowed, giving industry more time to marshal opposition against
proposed reforms.46 Draft bills contained numerous flashpoints, such as
the ability to set margin requirements, the role of specialists and floor
traders, regulation of proxies, and the composition of the new SEC.47
After months of painful compromise, the Exchange Act was enacted on
June 6, 1934.48
The Exchange Act set forth clear definitions for the terms “broker”
and “dealer.” It defined a broker as a person who effects transactions in
securities for another49 and a dealer as a person who buys and sells
securities for one’s own account.50 The Act also required registration of
securities exchanges and broker-dealer firms. It limited the amount of
credit one could use to purchase securities, required periodic reporting
for securities issues that were already registered, and prohibited
manipulation and fraud in the purchase and sale of securities. Perhaps
most importantly, the Exchange Act established the SEC to implement
and enforce the securities laws.51 The first slate of SEC commissioners
took office in July 1934, with Joseph P. Kennedy as Chairman.52
As passed, the Exchange Act did not provide for a self-regulatory
structure for broker-dealers. Shortly after passage, an industry
organization for securities dealers, the Investment Bankers Conference,
together with the SEC, sought an amendment to the Exchange Act to
authorize the formation of a self-regulatory organization (SRO) for
broker-dealer firms.53 The amendment passed in 1938 as the Maloney
46. See PARRISH, supra note 34, at 113.
47. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 85–100 (3d ed. 2003).
48. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 1, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78 (2006)).
49. Id. § 78c(a)(4)(A).
50. Id. § 78c(a)(5)(A).
51. See generally id. 15 U.S.C. § 78a–78oo (2006).
52. RICHARD J. WHALEN, THE FOUNDING FATHER: THE STORY OF JOSEPH P. KENNEDY 143–46
(1993).
53. VINCENT P. CAROSSO, INVESTMENT BANKING IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 390 (1970); Paul G.
Mahoney, The Political Economy of the Securities Act of 1933, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 23 (2001).
The National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), part of Roosevelt’s New Deal, permitted industry
self-regulatory groups to establish codes of conduct to eliminate unfair competitive practices,
enforceable by the federal courts. BADGER, supra note 43, at 74; Mahoney, supra, at 22–23. The
IBA created the Investment Bankers Code Committee and drafted a Code of Fair Competition for
Investment Bankers approved in 1934. In 1935, the NIRA was declared unconstitutional, Schechter
Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), but the investment banking industry continued to
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Act, which authorized an SRO.54 Thus, as early as 1939, broker-dealers
were subject to direct SEC regulation under the Exchange Act and
regulation by an SRO, which was the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD) at the time.55
2.

Investment Adviser Regulation Was Enacted in 1940

Unlike the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, the Investment
Advisers Act was not a response to crisis. By 1940, when the Advisers
Act was passed, the Great Crash was over a decade old and the country
was well past the statistical lows of 1933, which marked the nadir of the
Great Depression.56 Nor was the Advisers Act a response to scandal in
the investment advisory profession. The Advisers Act instead grew out
of study and reflection.57
In 1935, the SEC embarked on a comprehensive analysis of
investment trusts and investment companies, which was required by
Congress in the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. Among
the thirteen volumes comprising the study was a slim report entitled,
Investment Counsel, Investment Management, Investment Supervisory,
and Investment Advisory Services.58 The Commission’s jurisdiction to
investigate advisers was incidental to its authority to study investment
trusts and investment companies.59 The investment counsel report was
little more than a survey of advisory firms that responded to the
Commission’s request for information.
The report identified two concerns bedeviling advisory firms. The
first was that so-called “tipster” organizations were disguising

follow its Code of Fair Competition on a voluntary basis. Mahoney, supra, at 23. The Code
Committee reorganized into the Investment Bankers Conference and in 1939, the Investment
Bankers Conference reorganized into the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD).
WALLACE H. FULTON, HISTORY OF NASD 1 (undated monograph) (on file with author).
54. Maloney Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 719, 52 Stat. 1070 (codified as amended at 15. U.S.C.
§ 78o-3 (2006)) (adding § 15A to Securities Exchange Act).
55. In 2007, the NASD reorganized yet again as FINRA. FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., 2007
YEAR IN REVIEW AND ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT: SHAPING THE FUTURE OF REGULATION 8
(2007), available at http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/AnnualReports/index.htm.
56. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL
TIMES TO 1970, BICENTENNIAL EDITION, PART 1, at 126 (1975) (unemployment statistics); U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO
1970, BICENTENNIAL EDITION, PART 2, at 1004 (1975) (bond and stock prices).
57. S. REP. NO. 76-1775, at 1 (1940).
58. H.R. DOC. NO. 76-477 (1939).
59. Id. at 1.
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themselves as legitimate advisory organizations.60 Certain firms
providing advice were affiliated with investment banks or brokerage
firms and, therefore, had a vested interest in recommending particular
securities. Investment banks were securities merchants; they were paid
based on the spread between their purchase price and the sale price to
the customer. Such institutions were unable to provide objective advice.
As one adviser stated, “[A] merchant in securities to be sold at a profit is
primarily concerned with moving the wares he has on the shelf that he
will make money out of, and therefore is not in a position to give
unbiased advice, which we have stated to be the function of the
professional investment counsel.”61 The report emphasized that an
adviser cannot provide unbiased advice unless conflicts of interest were
removed. This concern over biased advice presages the current debate
over whether to place a fiduciary duty on brokers and will be revisited
shortly.
The second concern identified was that advisory firms had to contend
with numerous problems in their organization and operation.62 Although
many advisory firms did not assume custody of client securities, they
were not prohibited from doing so. The report pointed out that those
firms with custody had no requirements with respect to protecting client
assets, minimum net capital, or auditing of client securities by an
independent authority.63
In 1940, the U.S. Senate held hearings on a bill to regulate investment
companies and investment advisers.64 When the hearings were over, the
Senate report identified at least two reasons for federal regulation. One
was to protect the public from “fraud and misrepresentations of
unscrupulous tipsters and touts,” and the other was to protect bona fide
investment advisers from the “stigma” of associating with unscrupulous
members of the profession.65 The Act that emerged was the product of
compromise. The Senate report stated that the final bill resulted from
“cooperative efforts” on the part of the industry and the SEC, and the bill
had nearly unanimous bipartisan support.66

60. Id. at 28.
61. Id. at 29.
62. Id. at 27.
63. Id. at 30.
64. Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings on S. 3580 Before the Subcomm. of
the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency, Part 1, 76th Cong. 1 (1940) [hereinafter Hearings on S.
3580].
65. S. REP. NO. 76-1775, at 21 (1940).
66. Id. at 1–2. When describing the legislative process, Representative Charles Wolverton
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The Advisers Act defined “investment adviser” as “any person who,
for compensation, engages in the business of advising others, either
directly or through publications or writings, as to the value of securities
or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling
securities.”67 The Act required registration and annual reporting, and it
prohibited fraud perpetrated on any client or prospective client. As part
of the prohibition on fraud, the Act proscribed advisers from trading as
principals with their clients absent advanced written disclosure and
consent. The Act contained few other substantive requirements and was
considered to be little more than a compulsory census.68 It made no
attempt to determine who could act as an adviser or evaluate their
qualifications.69 And it did not provide for an SRO structure; the SEC
alone would implement the statute, unless criminal enforcement was
called for.70
Unlike the Exchange Act, which focused on securities transactions,
the Advisers Act focused on the relationship between an adviser and
client. Advisers who testified before the Senate in 1940 emphasized the
personal nature of the advisory relationship. One witness described the
profession as “a personal-service profession [that] depends for its
success upon a close personal and confidential relationship between the
investment-counsel firm and its client. It requires frequent and personal
contact of a professional nature between us and our clients. We must
know them well.”71 Another stated, “The relationship of investment
counsel to his client is essentially a personal one involving trust and
confidence.”72 Even the Supreme Court has noted the “delicate fiduciary
nature” of the investment advisory relationship.73

proudly observed that industry representatives were able to “sit down with the regulatory body, and,
around the table, discuss the problems and arrive at a fair and reasonable solution of them.” 86
CONG. REC. 9816 (1940).
67. Investment Advisers Act § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b–2(a)(11) (2006).
68. Hearings on S. 3580, supra note 64, at 48 (statement of David S. Schenker, Chief Counsel,
SEC).
69. Id.
70. Criminal enforcement was part of the Advisers Act since its passage. Investment Advisers
Act of 1940, ch. 686, § 209(e), 54 Stat. 847, 853 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(d)
(2006)).
71. Hearings on S. 3580, supra note 64, Part 2 at 713 (statement of Charles M. O’Hearn, Vice
President and Director, Clarke, Sinsabaugh & Co.).
72. Id. at 719 (statement of Alexander Standish, President, Standish, Racey & McKay, Inc.).
73. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191 (1963) (quoting 2 LOUIS
LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 1412 (2d ed. 1961)).
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Certain Broker-Dealers Were Excluded from the Advisers Act

As passed, the definition of investment adviser encompassed a
broker-dealer that advised a brokerage customer. In response, Congress
included a special exclusion from the Advisers Act for broker-dealers as
long as two conditions were met. First, the advice must be “solely
incidental” to the conduct of business as a broker or dealer. Second, the
broker-dealer must receive no “special compensation” for providing
advice.74 The Act defined neither “solely incidental” nor “special
compensation,” although a Senate report provided guidance on the
meaning of “special compensation.” The report clarified that the
exclusion applied only to broker-dealers that were paid on commission.75
If brokers were compensated in another manner, the compensation
would be deemed special compensation, abrogating application of the
exclusion.
There are at least two possible explanations for the broker-dealer
exclusion from the Advisers Act. One explanation is that it avoided
duplicative oversight. Because brokers were already subject to SEC and
NASD regulation under the Exchange Act, there was little need for an
additional layer of regulation under the Advisers Act. The SEC ascribed
this explanation to the exclusion in 2005,76 and this explanation has
support in legislative history.77 Another explanation is that Congress was
largely unconcerned with advice that was insignificant in amount.
Congress, therefore, excluded advice by broker-dealers, but only if it
was “solely incidental” to brokerage and only if the customer did not pay
special compensation for the advice. Paying separately for advice would
suggest the advice was not insignificant.78 The proper interpretation of
the phrase “solely incidental”—and the correct explanation for the
exclusion—are unsettled, but neither is important to this Article.79 A
74. Investment Advisers Act § 202(a)(11)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C) (2006).
75. S. REP. NO. 76-1775, at 22 (1940).
76. See Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not to Be Investment Advisers, Exchange Act Release
No. 50980, Advisers Act Release No. 2340, 70 Fed. Reg. 2716, 2719 n.40 (proposed Jan. 6, 2005)
[hereinafter 2005 Proposing Release].
77. See Hearings on S. 3580, supra note 64, Part 2 at 1008.
78. The phrase “solely incidental” was also used to exclude lawyers, accountants, engineers, and
teachers. Legislative history suggests that the lawyers’ exclusion was meant for advice that was
insignificant in amount. Id. at 766 (statement of Prof. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Harvard Law School);
see also Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings on H.R. 10065 Before the
Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 76th Cong. 90 (1940). The
broker-dealer exclusion, therefore, might be explained the same way.
79. Elsewhere I have given reasons why the most likely interpretation of “solely incidental” is
“insignificant” and, therefore, why the most likely explanation for the exclusion was to permit
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new fiduciary duty would apply to brokers even if the brokers’ advisory
activities continue to be otherwise excluded from the Advisers Act.
C.

The Regulation of Brokers and Advisers Differs

Differentiating between the legal standards applicable to brokers and
advisers when they provide advice to retail customers is a challenging
task.80 According to some sources, brokers that executed securities
transactions as agents for their customers were considered fiduciaries.
Both the Restatement (Second) of Agency and the Restatement (Third) of
Agency make plain that an agency relationship is fiduciary.81 In a 1936
report discussing the roles of brokers and dealers, the SEC wrote that the
relationship between a broker and a customer is fiduciary in nature and
consistent with obligations imposed on other agents.82
Notwithstanding early statements by the SEC regarding brokers’
fiduciary duties, courts have been inconsistent regarding whether
brokers are fiduciaries.83 Today, the consensus view is that brokers are
subject to a standard of suitability whereas advisers are subject to a
higher fiduciary standard.84 There is a significant difference between the
advice that was insignificant in amount. See Laby, supra note 19, at 419–20 (citing historical
sources). Although the proper interpretation of the phrase is important to the SEC and the courts as
they apply the exclusion, it is not important for the argument in this Article justifying a fiduciary
duty for brokers that give advice.
80. See Langevoort, supra note 7, at 443–44.
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01
(2006).
82. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE FEASIBILITY AND ADVISABILITY OF THE
COMPLETE SEGREGATION OF THE FUNCTIONS OF DEALER AND BROKER xiv (1936). Dealers trade
securities with customers from the dealers’ own accounts and, therefore, they are not agents in the
same sense as brokers. Notwithstanding the distinction between brokers and dealers, the SEC has
invoked the “shingle theory” in dealer cases, prohibiting conduct such as charging excessive markups. See Hughes v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943). Although the shingle theory was first applied
in excessive mark-up cases, it is not limited to those cases. HAZEN, supra note 30, at 608. Under the
shingle theory, a broker implicitly represents, by figuratively hanging out a shingle, that it will
conduct its business in an equitable and professional manner. Id. at 607.
83. See, e.g., SEC v. Pasternak, 561 F. Supp. 2d 459, 499 (D.N.J. 2008) (holding that the “weight
of the authority” is that a broker owes a fiduciary duty when a brokerage account is discretionary);
Duffy v. Cavalier, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1517, 1536 n.10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (“[T]here is in all cases a
fiduciary duty owed by a stockbroker to his or her customers; the scope of this duty depends on the
specific facts and circumstances presented in a given case.”) (emphasis in original). The
inconsistency is exacerbated by several factors, such as a dearth of litigated cases (most brokerage
disputes are arbitrated), the contractual nature of the duties imposed, and substantial variations in
state law. Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Obligations of Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers, 55
VILL. L. REV. 701, 704–16 (2010).
84. SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 1, at iii–iv; ANGELA A. HUNG ET AL., INVESTOR AND
INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS 10 (2008) [hereinafter
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brokers’ suitability rule and the advisers’ fiduciary standard. The
suitability rule requires that a broker-dealer have a reasonable basis to
believe a recommendation or investment strategy is suitable for a
customer based on information the broker must obtain through
reasonable diligence.85 A fiduciary standard is far more exacting. A
fiduciary standard is a “best interest” standard. Under a fiduciary
standard it is not sufficient to determine whether advice is suitable,
rather the adviser must act in the client’s best interest.86 Fiduciaries are
subject to a distinctive duty of loyalty,87 which, absent disclosure,
prohibits conflicts of interest when the fiduciary’s personal interest
conflicts with the principal’s interest,88 and conflicts of duty when the
interests of two or more principals conflict with one another.89
According to SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,90 the leading
Supreme Court case applying the Advisers Act, an adviser has a duty of
utmost good faith, a duty of full and fair disclosure of all material facts,
and a duty to use reasonable care to avoid misleading clients.91 There is
RAND REPORT], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-1_randiabdreport.pdf; Jane
J. Kim & Aaron Lucchetti, Big Changes in Store for Brokers in Obama’s Oversight Overhaul,
WALL ST. J., June 19, 2009, at C1; David Serchuk, Suitability: Where Brokers Fail, FORBES, June
24, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/06/23/suitability-standards-fiduciary-intelligent-investingbrokers.html. In certain circumstances, brokers are held to a higher standard. For example, when a
broker has discretion over an account, the broker owes a fiduciary duty. U.S. v. Skelly, 442 F.3d 94,
98 (2d Cir. 2006) (a fiduciary duty is most commonly found when a broker has discretionary
authority over an account); Pasternak, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 499. Discretion is authority akin to a
power of attorney to trade without a customer’s prior approval. Moreover, individual facts and
circumstances can change the rule. If a relationship of trust and confidence has developed between
the parties, a court may impose a fiduciary obligation. The classic case is Arleen W. Hughes, 27
S.E.C. 629 (1948), aff’d sub nom. Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (noting that
fiduciary duties are imposed on brokers who place themselves in a position of trust and confidence).
85. FINRA Regulatory Notice 11-02, at 2 (Jan. 2011), available at http://www.finra.org/Industry/
Regulation/Notices/2011/P122779.
86. The Advisers Act contains a general antifraud provision, which courts have interpreted to
impose a federal fiduciary duty on advisers. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471 n.11
(1977) (stating that Congress intended section 206 of the Advisers Act, the antifraud provision, to
establish “federal fiduciary standards” for advisers); see also SEC v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106, 146
(1st Cir. 2008) (“Section 206 imposes a fiduciary duty on investment advisers to act at all times in
the best interest of the fund and its investors . . . .”), reh’g granted & opinion withdrawn, 573 F.3d
54 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Lay, 568 F. Supp. 2d 791, 812 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (an adviser
must “act in good faith and in the best interests of its client”).
87. See Deborah A. DeMott, Disloyal Agents, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1049 (2007).
88. See, e.g., Birnbaum v. Birnbaum, 539 N.E.2d 574, 576 (N.Y. 1989).
89. See, e.g., Arthur B. Laby, Resolving Conflicts of Duty in Fiduciary Relationships, 54 AM. U.
L. REV. 75 (2004); Steven L. Schwarcz, Fiduciaries with Conflicting Obligations, 94 MINN. L. REV.
1867 (2010).
90. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
91. Id. at 194 (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 534–35 (2d ed.
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no analog to the Capital Gains case for broker-dealers.
Let us review the relatively stable state of affairs in the mid-twentieth
century as to the roles and regulation of brokers and advisers as
compared to the uncertainty and inconsistency of today. At that time,
brokers performed their standard functions of executing trades, selling
securities, making loans, maintaining custody of client funds and
securities, arranging for delivery of certificates, performing recordkeeping functions, and providing advice incidental to the performance of
brokerage services.92 They were generally paid on commission, and they
were regulated under the Securities Exchange Act, subject to a duty of
suitability enforced by the SEC and FINRA.93 Investment advisers
generally limited themselves to providing investment advice, including
portfolio selection, asset allocation, portfolio management, selection of
other advisers, and financial planning. They typically charged an assetbased fee, and they were regulated under the Investment Advisers Act,
subject to a fiduciary standard of conduct enforced by the SEC.94 Some
firms were dual registrants, registered as both broker-dealers and
investment advisers. In those cases, the SEC regulated the firms on an
account-by-account basis.95 The elegance of this regulatory scheme,
however, would not last. During the 1970s, changes in the securities
industry called into question the adequacy and logic of the regulatory
scheme constructed forty years earlier.
D.

Changes in the Securities Industry Disrupted the Coherency of
Broker and Adviser Regulation
Beginning in 1975, the financial services industry underwent rapid

1955) and 1 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 541 (1956)). Advisers
must disclose material information, including conflicts of interest, and information about fees,
recommendations, and disciplinary information about the advisory firm and firm personnel.
Ensuring Appropriate Regulatory Oversight of Broker-Dealers and Legislative Proposals to
Improve Investment Adviser Oversight, Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t
Sponsored Enter., 112th Cong. 9 (2011) (statement of David G. Tittsworth, Executive Director and
Executive
Vice
President,
Investment
Adviser
Association),
available
at
http://financialservices.house.gov/Calendar/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=258252.
92. See 2005 Proposing Release, supra note 76, at 2719–20.
93. Brokers were also subject to liability in private actions, generally subject to arbitration in
accordance with pre-dispute arbitration agreements signed by most investors. See generally Jill I.
Gross & Barbara Black, When Perception Changes Reality: An Empirical Study of Investors’ Views
of the Fairness of Securities Arbitration, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 349 (2008).
94. There were few private actions brought under the Advisers Act because the Supreme Court
ruled in 1979 that there is only a very limited private right of action under the Advisers Act.
Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979).
95. Adopting Release, supra note 10, at 20,440 n.165.
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change, leading to today’s dilemma over whether to harmonize the
regulation of brokers and advisers. Some of the changes were related to
brokers’ compensation; others were related to marketing and advertising.
In both cases, the events challenged the theory that brokers offered
advice “solely incidental” to brokerage and received no “special
compensation” for the advice.
1.

The Elimination of Fixed Commissions Resulted in Two-Tier
Pricing

For many years brokerage commissions in the United States were
fixed by government fiat.96 The system of fixed commissions, in place
since 1792, was advantageous to broker-dealer firms. For example, in
the years 1961 to 1968, fixed commissions resulted in a six-fold increase
in income for brokerage firms.97 The system of fixed commissions,
however, officially ended on May 1, 1975—known as May Day—when
the SEC prohibited any exchange from requiring members to charge
fixed rates.98 Although it is unlikely that anyone noticed at the time,
commission rate deregulation launched a series of events that called into
question the ability of broker-dealers to take advantage of the broker
exclusion in the Advisers Act.
Deregulation led to rapidly declining rates and the advent of discount
brokerage for customers who preferred lower commissions over the
amenities of full service brokerage.99 For example, in September 1975,
Charles Schwab opened its first branch office in Sacramento,
California.100 Established brokerage firms, not about to cede the discount
market to Schwab, followed its lead.101 Several began to offer two tiers
of service: a discount brokerage tier, which was effectively “execution
only,” and a full service tier, which included advice. Two-tier pricing
jeopardized application of the broker exclusion. Recall that a broker
could not take advantage of the exclusion if it received special

96. SELIGMAN, supra note 47, at 301–02.
97. Id. at 411; see also Janice M. Traflet & Michael P. Coyne, Ending a NYSE Tradition: The
1975 Unraveling of Brokers’ Fixed Commissions and Its Long Term Impact on Financial
Advertising, 25 ESSAYS IN ECON. & BUS. HIS. 131, 132 (2007).
98. See generally MARSHALL E. BLUME ET AL., REVOLUTION ON WALL STREET: THE RISE AND
DECLINE OF THE NYSE 128–42 (1993).
99. Traflet & Coyne, supra note 97, at 136.
100. See History, CHARLES SCHWAB CORP., http://www.aboutschwab.com/about/
schwab_history (last visited Aug. 17, 2012).
101. Traflet & Coyne, supra note 97, at 138.
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compensation for advice.102 If a broker offered one fee for “executiononly” service and a higher fee for full service, the difference between the
two fees might be attributable to advice, vitiating application of the
exclusion.103
2.

Certain Broker-Dealers Began to Charge Asset-Based Fees

The advent of a two-tier pricing model was not the only development
that endangered application of the broker exclusion. In the 1990s, many
brokers migrated from charging commissions to charging asset-based
fees. This migration had its own history, propelled by Arthur Levitt, Jr.,
SEC Chairman from 1993 until 2001. Levitt’s roots were in the
brokerage industry. In 1963, he joined Carter, Berlind & Weill, and
eventually became President of its successor firm, Shearson Hayden
Stone.104 Levitt also served as an American Stock Exchange governor
and was its president from 1978 to 1989.105 Levitt understood as well as
anyone the conflicts of interest inherent in broker-dealer compensation.
In fact, he had previously nettled some of his partners by calling on
brokers to be paid based on client returns as opposed to commissions.106
Years later, broker compensation remained one of Levitt’s priorities.
In a 1994 speech before the NASD, he criticized the broker who “churns
and burns a client and then bounces to the next firm.”107 Levitt
applauded creative ideas being tested in the industry and noted that some
firms offered investors a choice between paying commissions or an
annual fee.108 Levitt welcomed such innovation and announced that the
SEC would take a “fresh look” at compensation.109
To that end, Levitt established a Committee on Compensation
Practices, led by Daniel Tully, then Chairman and CEO of Merrill
Lynch, to examine compensation and incentive practices. The
Committee’s report (The Tully Report) concluded that at least a portion
of a registered representative’s compensation should be based on the

102. See supra Part I.B.3.
103. Adopting Release, supra note 10, at 20,448.
104. SELIGMAN, supra note 47, at 626.
105. Id. at 627.
106. ARTHUR LEVITT, TAKE ON THE STREET 7 (2002).
107. Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC, Remarks Before the National Association of Securities
Dealers (May 19, 1994) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
speecharchive/1994/spch005.txt).
108. Id.
109. Id.
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amount of assets held in the account so that the broker would be paid
even if his advice were to “do nothing.”110 The Tully Report’s
recommendations persuaded several firms to begin offering fee-based
brokerage accounts.111 The SEC understood that some brokers would be
reluctant to offer fee-based services because receiving non-commissionbased compensation could abrogate application of the broker
exclusion.112 The twin developments of two-tier pricing and asset-based
fees applied pressure on the legacy application of the broker exclusion’s
“special compensation” prong and necessitated a solution.113
3.

The Focus of Brokerage Services Moved from Execution to Advice

Stock brokerage looked very different in the 1990s than it did in the
1930s and 1940s.114 In the 1930s, order execution was a complicated
process.115 Orders to buy and sell securities were first communicated to
the exchange floor. A floor broker would then carry orders to a specialist
who made a market in a given security. For liquid stocks, a floor broker
would match orders with another floor broker standing at the specialist’s
post, or against an order previously entered in the specialist’s book. If an
order could not be matched, the specialist might act as a dealer and trade
out of his own account to maintain liquidity. The floor broker could also
enter a limit order in the specialist’s book to be executed at a specified
price.116 One contemporaneous source referred to the “skill, care, and
probity” by which execution of orders was accomplished.117
The broker’s advisory function, by contrast, was of less importance.118
When the Advisers Act was enacted, broker-dealers employed salesmen,
who, in many cases, lacked the expertise to perform a true advisory
110. DANIEL P. TULLY ET AL., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COMPENSATION PRACTICES (Apr.
10, 1995), available at www.sec.gov/news/studies/bkrcomp.txt.
111. 1999 Proposing Release, supra note 8, at 61,228.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Joel Seligman, The Obsolescence of Wall Street: A Contextual Approach to the Evolving
Structure of Federal Securities Regulation, 93 MICH. L. REV. 649, 655 (1995) (noting that “to
modern eyes, the trading mechanisms of the early 1930s were quite primitive”).
115. Mildred Adams, A Portrait of the Wall Street Broker, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1933, at SM8
(explaining that the process of brokerage is more complex than imagined).
116. SELIGMAN, supra note 47, at 487.
117. RUDOLPH L. WEISSMAN, THE NEW WALL STREET 6 (1939).
118. This state of affairs where brokers’ advisory role was of secondary importance was itself a
shift from the late 1800s, when brokers performed a true advisory function. See ROBERT SOBEL,
INSIDE WALL STREET 100 (Beard Books 2000) (1977). That older history, however, is not relevant
to this Article.

Laby - FINAL Word.docx (Do Not Delete)

730

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

11/1/2012 11:20 AM

[Vol. 87:707

function. Securities salesmen typically made a decision early in their
careers to concentrate on either research analysis or customer contact,
but not both.119 Although salesmen dispensed some advice, they
generally only did so by passing along information from the research
department or other partners at the firm.120 Many securities salesmen
were so-called “customers’ men.” Customers’ men functioned much like
order clerks, accepting orders from customers, transmitting them for
execution, and reporting back to the customer once the execution was
complete.121 Although brokers did provide advice to customers before
the mid-twentieth century, execution was the main task. The idea that
advice could be “solely incidental” to brokerage was befitting of the
time.
Developments in the ensuing decades tilted the balance of brokers’
activity away from execution and toward advice. The birth of electronic
markets and the development of electronic trading automated much of
the day-to-day enterprise of transaction execution without the use of
specialists, floor brokers, runners, and messengers.122 Electronic trading
eased the difficulties of execution and simultaneously increased the
speed by which information could be communicated, making timely
information and analysis a vital commodity. As securities execution
receded in importance, brokers enhanced their value by providing high
quality advice. In today’s market, advice is what investors value most.123
As early as 1991, broker-dealers began to explicitly tell customers that
they should consider the broker-dealer registered representative more of
an adviser than a stockbroker.124 The 1995 Tully Report concluded that
the “most important role” of the registered representative is providing
investment advice to clients.125
As will be discussed in Part III, by the 1990s, there were many
examples where leading wire houses advertised their services as
advisory, with one firm stating that advice and not execution is the core
of the customer relationship.126 Similar to how the advent of two-tier
119. Id. at 9.
120. Id. at 9, 154.
121. Id. at 12; WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 110 (Kennikat Press 1969)
(1940).
122. Andre E. Owens & Christie Farris Öberg, Rise of Electronic Trading, in BROKER DEALER
REGULATION, PLIREF-BDR § 18.3 (2011); Seligman, supra note 114, at 665.
123. See Laby, supra note 19, at 423–24.
124. Letter from Barbara Roper, Dir. of Investor Prot., Consumer Fed’n of Am., to Jonathan G.
Katz, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 7–8 (Jan. 13, 2000).
125. TULLY ET AL., supra note 110, at 3.
126. See infra Part 3.A; Roper, supra note 124, at 8.
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pricing and asset-based fees applied pressure on application of the
“special compensation” prong of the broker exclusion, the importance of
the broker’s advice and the manner in which he held himself out to the
public put pressure on the application of the “solely incidental”
requirement.
E.

The SEC Addressed Changes in Compensation Through an
Administrative Rule

Change often leads to uncertainty, and such was the case with the
developments discussed here. Brokerage firms were concerned that feebased or full service brokerage accounts would become subject to the
Advisers Act, which would have imposed a fiduciary duty on each
account. As a result, brokers sought relief from the SEC to continue
taking advantage of the broker exclusion with respect to those
accounts.127 Chairman Levitt, nearing the end of his term, was eager to
see firms comply with his long-desired reforms and was willing to meet
them halfway with a new exemptive rule.128 In 1999, the SEC proposed
a rule with the apt title, “Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not To Be
Investment Advisers.”129 The rule prevented application of the Advisers
Act to brokerage accounts solely because the firm instituted a two-tier
pricing structure or charged fee-based compensation.130 The rule would
have effectively eliminated the “no special compensation” prong of the
broker exclusion and permitted brokers to benefit from the exclusion
regardless of the type of compensation received. Perhaps because
brokers were already offering fee-based accounts, raising the concern
that they were in violation of the Advisers Act, the SEC’s proposing
release, in a rare twist, contained “no action” language that allowed
firms to conduct business as if the rule had already been adopted.131
127. Letter from Ira D. Hammerman, Senior Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Sec. Indus. & Fin.
Mkts. Ass’n, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 3 (Feb. 7, 2005), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72599/sia020705.pdf (“[A]n Exchange Act-registered brokerdealer’s offering its customers the alternative of paying a fee rather than a commission for
brokerage services should not result in the broker-dealer’s becoming subject to the provisions of the
Advisers Act.”).
128. See generally Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Financial Self-Defense:
Tips From an SEC Insider (Oct. 16, 1999) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/speecharchive/1999/spch305.htm); Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
Common Sense Investing in the 21st Century Marketplace (May 23, 1999) (transcript available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch280.htm).
129. 1999 Proposing Release, supra note 8.
130. Id. at 61,228.
131. Id. at 61,227.
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As expected, the industry splintered over the merits of the proposal.
Brokerage firms supported the rule while advisers were firmly
opposed.132 Just as advisers were concerned about so called tipsters in
1939 and 1940, advisers in the 1990s maintained that under the proposed
rule, brokers could disguise themselves as advisers in all material
respects while avoiding the onerous responsibilities of the Advisers Act.
Advisers argued that the rule would both allow brokers to compete
unfairly and deny investors important protections under the Advisers
Act.133 The Commission proposed a modified rule in January 2005134
and adopted the final version in April 2005.135 The FPA challenged the
rule in Financial Planning Ass’n v. SEC before the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.136 The court sided with the FPA and
vacated the rule.137
Removal of the rule left an unsettling gap for investors, regulators,
firms, and their lawyers. By vacating the rule, the court effectively
eliminated the SEC’s “no action” position, under which brokers were
already acting as if the rule had been adopted, placing customers into
fee-based brokerage accounts. Absent the new rule, every fee-based
132. 2005 Proposing Release, supra note 76, at 2718.
133. Id.
134. 2005 Proposing Release, supra note 76.
135. Adopting Release, supra note 10.
136. Fin. Planning Ass’n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481, 493 (D.C. Cir. 2007). According to the
Government Accountability Office, financial planning involves several services, such as preparing
financial plans for clients based on their financial circumstances and objectives, making specific
recommendations to clients, and helping to implement those recommendations. Implementation
could include providing insurance, securities, or other financial products. Individuals who provide
financial planning might be associated with an investment adviser or a broker-dealer or both. GAO,
REGULATORY COVERAGE GENERALLY EXISTS FOR FINANCIAL PLANNERS, BUT CONSUMER
PROTECTION ISSUES REMAIN 2 (2011).
137. Fin. Planning Ass’n, 482 F.3d at 493. The FPA first challenged the rule in 2004. After the
final rule was adopted in 2005, the FPA filed another petition for review and the cases were
consolidated and decided in March 2007. See generally id. Although the case raised policy issues,
the court decided the matter on technical legal grounds, holding that the SEC lacked the statutory
authority to adopt the rule. The decision turned on the SEC’s authority in the definitional section of
the statute. Section 202(a)(11) of the Act defined the term investment adviser. As discussed, section
202(a)(11)(C) excluded broker-dealers whose advice was solely incidental to brokerage and that did
not charge special compensation for advice. Section 202(a)(11)(F) contained authority for the SEC
to exclude “such other persons not within the intent of this paragraph.” Id. at 485. The SEC argued
that section 202(a)(11)(F) enabled it to exclude brokers that do receive special compensation
because such brokers provide advice in much the same way as brokers that are already excluded;
only their method of compensation has changed. The FPA argued that the authority to exclude
“other” persons referred to persons other than a category of persons already subject to an exclusion,
namely brokers. Thus, any administrative exclusion for brokers adopted by the SEC was
impermissible under the grant of statutory authority. The majority agreed with the FPA and vacated
the rule. Id. at 493.
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brokerage account was arguably an advisory account, subject to the full
panoply of investor protections in the Advisers Act, including the strict
limitations on principal trading discussed above.138
F.

The Obama Administration and Congress Sought a Political
Solution to Changes in the Securities Industry

The SEC’s ill-fated regulatory response attempted to relieve brokers
charging special compensation from application of the Advisers Act. As
might be expected, Congress took a broader view, responding to a wider
array of constituencies and seeking a more comprehensive solution to
the conundrum presented by changes in the industry.139 Like the SEC’s
response, the political response addressed brokers’ compensation, but it
went further and took into account shifts in the broker’s role and patterns
of marketing of brokerage services.
When the D.C. Circuit vacated the SEC’s rule in 2007, the time was
ripe for regulatory harmonization to be taken up in legislation. In 2007,
the housing bubble collapsed and by 2008, the Obama Administration,
acting through the United States Department of Treasury (Treasury), was
considering comprehensive regulatory reforms to address the unfolding
financial crisis.140 Although the division between brokers and advisers
played little role in the collapse, political capital to address financial
regulatory reform was high, and impending legislation provided a rare
opportunity to address regulatory harmonization in a comprehensive
fashion. In its 2008 Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory
Structure, Treasury stated that an important factor distinguishing
advisers from brokers was that advisers are fiduciaries and owe their
clients a duty of “undivided loyalty.”141 By contrast, Treasury said,
brokers are subject to a duty of suitability.142 The Blueprint noted the
convergence of services provided by brokers and advisers. Treasury
found that the failure to adjust to market developments had led to
138. See supra section I.B.2. To address the predicament regarding principal trading, the SEC
passed a temporary rule relieving such brokers from the strictures of the principal trading
requirements. Principal Trades with Certain Advisory Clients, Advisers Act Release No. 3128, 75
Fed. Reg. 82236 (Dec. 30, 2010). The temporary rule was extended through December 31, 2012. Id.
139. Under the separation-of-powers doctrine, agencies refine standards or apply them to
particular cases while Congress sets policy and drafts broad principles. Indus. Union Dep’t, AFLCIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 675 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
140. THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 233 (2011);
TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 21.
141. TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 21, at 121.
142. Id.
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investor confusion. The Blueprint recommended statutory changes to
harmonize the regulation of brokers and advisers offering similar
services.143
In 2009, Treasury issued a white paper on reform that echoed the
2008 Blueprint.144 According to the white paper, an investment adviser
and a broker providing incidental advice are identical from an investor’s
vantage point, and investors repose the same degree of trust in brokers as
they repose in advisers.145 Treasury recommended new legislation to
require that broker-dealers providing advice “have the same fiduciary
obligations” as advisers.146
Treasury’s recommendations in 2008 and 2009 marked an important
shift from earlier reform efforts. Whereas the SEC’s approach was
exemptive and permissive, Treasury’s was regulatory and restrictive.
The SEC focused on compensation and on whether brokers might
inadvertently become subject to the Advisers Act. The SEC had sought
to exempt brokers from being regulated as advisers. Treasury’s
approach, by contrast, recognized developments in the financial services
market, including the enhanced role brokers play in dispensing advice.
As a result of these developments, Treasury sought to place additional
duties on brokers. The SEC, in other words, tried to limit the number of
brokers that would be subject to the Advisers Act and to a concomitant
fiduciary duty; Treasury sought to expand the number of brokers that
would be subject to a fiduciary obligation.147
After months of wrangling, the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted in July
2010.148 Among other things, the law addressed systemic risk in the
financial system, enhanced the regulation of derivatives, established the
new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, increased federal deposit
insurance, and eliminated the registration exemption for hedge fund
advisers.149 Congress addressed regulatory harmonization of broker143. Id. at 125–26. Treasury also recommended that advisers be subject to a self-regulatory
regime similar to the one for broker-dealers. Id. at 126. The SRO issue is still timely but it is not
addressed in this Article.
144. TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 13, at 71–72.
145. Id. at 71.
146. Id. at 72.
147. Compare Adopting Release, supra note 10, at 20,434–36, with TREASURY WHITE PAPER,
supra note 13, at 72.
148. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 14, § 913.
149. See generally DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL (2011); SIMPSON THACHER &
BARTLETT LLP, REFLECTIONS ON DODD-FRANK: A LOOK BACK AND A LOOK FORWARD (2011),
available at http://www.stblaw.com/google_file.cfm?TrackedFile=
6956153B528CAE9F89BB6C7C98B376BB57B9049AD88C05BC9BAD&TrackedFolder=4B5715
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dealers and investment advisers in Section 913 of the Act.150 Section 913
has two parts. First, it required the SEC to study the effectiveness of
existing legal or regulatory standards for brokers, dealers, and
investment advisers when providing personalized investment advice
about securities to retail customers, and any potential gaps in the
regulatory standards.151 Second, the Act authorized the SEC to impose a
fiduciary duty on brokers that give advice to retail customers about
securities.152 Congress did not impose a fiduciary obligation; it handed
the baton to the SEC.
The SEC released the Section 913 Study in January 2011.153 The
Study contained two principal recommendations. First, it recommended
that the Commission consider adopting a rule that applied a uniform
fiduciary standard to broker-dealers and investment advisers when
providing personalized investment advice about securities to retail
customers.154 Second, the Study recommended that regulatory
protections be harmonized, especially when brokers and advisers are
performing the same or similar functions.155 The staff identified several
areas where regulation of brokers and advisers differs and suggested
how they could be brought into accord.156 In light of the Section 913
Study, the decision of whether to impose a fiduciary duty on brokers that
give advice rests squarely on the SEC’s shoulders. Therefore, a key
question is whether the Commission will be persuaded by arguments in
favor of a new fiduciary rule. Part II critiques those arguments.

78.
150. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 14, § 913(b).
151. Id. § 913(b).
152. Section 913 amended the Exchange Act to give the SEC authority to adopt rules to provide
that a broker or dealer, when providing personalized investment advice about securities, has the
same standard of conduct as an adviser. Id. § 913(g)(1). New rules, if adopted, must provide that the
standard of conduct applicable to broker-dealers be “no less stringent” than the standards applicable
under sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the Advisers Act, which hold advisers to a fiduciary duty. Id.
§ 913(g)(2). Section 913 also provided the SEC with authority to establish a standard of care for
brokers, dealers, and advisers to act in the “best interest” of their customers—the traditional
fiduciary standard. Id.
153. SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 1. The Section 913 Study was authored by the staff,
although the Commission authorized its release.
154. The Study left certain details to be worked out in the future. For example, at a later date, the
Commission would have to address conflicts of interest and decide how broker-dealers would fulfill
their fiduciary obligation when engaging in principal trading. SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 1, at
vii.
155. Id. at 129.
156. Id. at 130–39.
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II.

CONVENTIONAL ARGUMENTS THAT SUPPORT A
FIDUCIARY DUTY FOR BROKERS ARE INADEQUATE

The Dodd-Frank Act gave the SEC legal authority to adopt a
fiduciary duty for brokers, but the Act did not mandate a fiduciary
standard, leaving the decision in the SEC’s hands. As a result, after over
a decade of deliberation and quarrelling over this issue—including a
contested administrative rule,157 controversial federal legislation,158 and
numerous surveys and studies159—the question of whether to impose a
fiduciary duty has returned to the SEC. Academics, interest groups, and
policy makers have propounded several justifications for the change.
This Part of the Article critiques the most commonly asserted reasons.
Although some of the arguments supporting a fiduciary standard are
stronger than others, they are all incomplete in important respects and do
not alone provide a justification for a fiduciary duty. The conventional
arguments put forth to support a fiduciary standard include the
following: (i) investors are confused about applicable standards for
brokers and advisers, (ii) obligations currently imposed on brokers and
advisers are inconsistent, (iii) obligations currently imposed on brokers
are weak and ought to be enhanced, (iv) the economic benefits of a
fiduciary standard will exceed the costs, and (v) investors expect brokers
to operate under a fiduciary standard.
Some of these reasons overlap. For example, investors might be
confused about which standard applies because the standards are
inconsistent. Similarly, investors might be confused because they expect
brokers to operate under a fiduciary standard. Despite this overlap, I
distinguish each argument as much as possible. The last reason, investor
expectations, comes closest to providing a strong foundation for
imposing a fiduciary duty on brokers. As explained below, however, this
argument is not sufficient because expectations must be reasonable to
ground a fiduciary obligation; empirical expectations are not enough.
Before delving into reasonable expectations, let us first examine each
argument in more detail.

157. See supra Part I.E.
158. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 14, § 913.
159. SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 1; RAND REPORT, supra note 84, at 90.
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A.

Investor Confusion Is an Insufficient Basis to Support a Fiduciary
Standard

1.

Advocates of a Fiduciary Standard Claim Investor Confusion
Justifies Regulatory Harmonization

A common justification for placing a fiduciary duty on brokers that
give advice is investor confusion, which in large part stems from titles
that broker-dealer registered representatives use, such as “financial
advisor” and “financial consultant.”160 Investor confusion was
highlighted in a Rand Institute for Civil Justice report (Rand Report)
from 2008.161 When the SEC adopted its exemptive rule in 2005, it
recognized the complexity of the issues it was addressing and directed
the SEC staff to prepare recommendations for a study. The resulting
report, not to be confused with the Section 913 Study,162 was intended to
compare protections provided to retail customers under the Exchange
Act163 and the Advisers Act,164 and to recommend ways to address
concerns arising from any differences.165 The SEC engaged the Rand
Institute to complete the report and released it in January 2008. The
Rand Report described brokerage and advisory services and examined
whether investors understood the differences between them.166
The Rand Report found a great deal of investor confusion regarding
the roles of brokers and advisers.167 The Report documented that
investors are confused about job titles, types of firms, and legal
160. RAND REPORT, supra note 84, at 90; see also Fausti, supra note 19, at 191 (explaining that
the Administration’s recommendation for a uniform fiduciary standard is “based on the widespread
recognition that retail investors are often confused about the differences between investment
advisers and broker-dealers”); Irwin, Lane & Mendelson, supra note 19, at 53 (“Recent surveys
concerning investors’ understanding of the distinctions between broker-dealers and investment
advisers indicate an understandable confusion.”); Di Lorenzo, supra note 19, at 295 (“Dodd-Frank
is necessary, therefore, to impose uniform duties on broker-dealers in order to help eliminate
uncertainty in the duties broker-dealers owe to their clients, and thereby increase investor
protection.”); Knut Rostad, Strengthen Disclosures by Limiting Their Role in the Delivery of
Investment and Financial Advice, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 141, 144–46 (2011) (reviewing
studies regarding investor confusion about brokers and advisers); Varnavides, supra note 19, at 204
(“[B]roker-dealers and investment advisers offer virtually identical services to investors, resulting in
considerable confusion for both investors and regulators.”).
161. RAND REPORT, supra note 84, at 90.
162. See supra Part I.F.
163. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78oo (2006).
164. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2006).
165. Adopting Release, supra note 10, at 20,442.
166. SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 1, at i.
167. RAND REPORT, supra note 84, at 87.
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distinctions between financial services professionals. According to
Rand, 49% of respondents believed advisers must act in a customer’s
best interest, while 42% believed that brokers must act in a customer’s
best interest.168 Surprisingly, more people thought that brokers (as
opposed to advisers) were required to disclose conflicts.169 Some
respondents did not understand the term “fiduciary” and did not know
that a fiduciary standard is higher than a suitability standard.170 Another
study conducted by TD Ameritrade in 2006 found that 74% of investors
did not understand the respective duties imposed on brokers and
advisers.171
The ubiquity of investor confusion became a justification for reform.
The Treasury Department referenced the Rand Report in 2008 to
demonstrate that investors did not understand the differences between
brokers and advisers or the standards under which they operated.172
Treasury stated that the regulatory system had “failed to adjust to market
developments, leading to investor confusion,” and thus recommended
legislative changes to harmonize the standards.173 Treasury again
invoked this justification in 2009, repeating that retail investors were
confused over differences between brokers and advisers, and placed the
same degree of trust in brokers as they did in advisers.174 Treasury
concluded that the SEC should be permitted to harmonize brokers’ and
advisers’ duties and that brokers that provide advice to retail customers
should be governed by the same fiduciary standard as advisers.175
The SEC staff made the same argument in the Section 913 Study. The
Study showed that retail customers are confused by the role of brokers
and advisers, and customers of both should be uniformly protected.176
Industry and public interest groups advocating a fiduciary standard
similarly point to confusion, arguing that it leads to the inability to make
168. SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 1, at 89.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 111; Ensuring Appropriate Regulatory Oversight of Broker-Dealers and Legislative
Proposals to Improve Investment Adviser Oversight, Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on Capital
Mkts.& Gov’t Sponsored Enters., 112th Cong. 3 (2011) (statement of The Financial Planning
Coalition), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/Calendar/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=
258252.
171. TD AMERITRADE, WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT FINANCIAL ADVICE 1 (2006) (on file
with author).
172. TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 21, at 125.
173. Id. at 125–26.
174. TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 13, at 71.
175. Id.
176. SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 1, at 101, 107.
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an informed decision when selecting a financial intermediary. In
Congressional testimony, proponents of the fiduciary standard stated that
if all or a large majority of investors understood the differences between
brokers and advisers, the case for harmonization would diminish.177
Moreover, these advocates argued that confusion cannot be solved
through disclosure or investor education.178
2.

Investor Confusion Is Not a Compelling Argument for Regulatory
Harmonization

Although it seems investor confusion should be eliminated whenever
possible, there are at least three reasons why investor confusion alone
does not justify a fiduciary standard. First, changing the standard may
simply switch the population that is confused, alleviating confusion for
some while causing it for others. Recall that 42% of respondents
mistakenly believed that brokers must act in a customer’s best interest.179
Many investors, all or part of the remaining 58%, may be well aware
that brokers owe no such obligation. By changing the rule, those who
wrongly believed that brokers are fiduciaries would now be correct,
while ironically the other group might become confused.180
Second, enhancing the standard of care seems to get the solution
backward. Instead of addressing the cause of confusion by correcting
investors’ misunderstanding, imposing a fiduciary obligation alters the
state of affairs, bringing reality into accord with investors’ confused
perceptions regardless of whether the change is necessary or appropriate
independent of confusion. As an analogy, if the speed limit on a highway
were 65 m.p.h. but drivers were confused and believed it was 55 m.p.h.,
confusion alone would not be a reason to lower the speed limit to 55.
There are many areas where consumers could be confused about
professional roles and standards, yet it would be illogical to harmonize
177. Ensuring Appropriate Regulatory Oversight of Broker-Dealers and Legislative Proposals to
Improve Investment Adviser Oversight, Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. and
Gov’t Sponsored Enters., 112th Cong. 4 (2011) (statement of Barbara Roper, Director of Investor
Protection, Consumer Federation of America), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/
Calendar/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=258252.
178. Id. at 5.
179. See supra Part II.A.1.
180. It is no response that investors could be educated as to the applicable standard because those
making the claim about confusion also state that no amount of investor disclosure or education can
resolve it. See Roper, supra note 177, at 5. That said, the 58% who now correctly understand
brokers’ duties may be more highly educated or more sophisticated than the 42% who are confused
and, therefore, the 58% might become aware of regulatory changes and avoid confusion. Even so,
some portion of the 58% may become confused if the standard changes.
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those roles and standards simply to eliminate confusion.181
There might be some instances where confusion alone justifies a
change in the law. For example, if a single state were to allow motorists
to drive on the left, driver confusion might be a reason to prohibit the
change and require everyone to drive on the right. In this example,
confusion would justify a change because the decision to drive on the
right is largely arbitrary. It does not really matter on which side of the
road one drives so long as it is the same side as everyone else. In the
broker-dealer context, however, the respective responsibilities of brokers
and advisers are not arbitrary. The responsibilities are tied closely to the
different roles they play in the markets, which should not be overlooked
merely to avoid confusion.182
Third, a fiduciary standard would not necessarily solve investor
confusion because a fiduciary standard for brokers authorized by the
Dodd-Frank Act would itself vary from other fiduciary standards.183 The
fiduciary obligation is notoriously ambiguous.184 The Section 913 Study
noted this ambiguity and stated that the Commission would have to
specify what is required by a new fiduciary obligation.185 Although the
Dodd-Frank Act requires that if a fiduciary standard is imposed on
brokers it must be at least as strong as the standard imposed on advisers,
181. Consider an example from health care. Physician Assistants (PAs) and nurses perform
different functions and operate under different standards, and consumers may be confused about
their respective roles and obligations. PAs perform certain functions of physicians and cannot
delegate their duties or supervise others. PETER PRATT & LISA KATZ, SCOPE OF PRACTICE OF
HEALTH PROFESSIONALS IN THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 16, 39 (2001). PAs must renew their license
every six years. Id. at 60. By contrast, nurses focus on prevention, health promotion, education, and
patient assistance. Id. at 20. They are permitted to delegate duties and supervise other nurses, and
they must renew their license every two years. Id. at 39, 65. If patients were confused about the
responsibilities of PAs and nurses, it would be illogical to harmonize their obligations, such as by
requiring PAs to renew their license every two years, or by prohibiting nurses from delegating tasks,
merely to eliminate patient confusion. One would inquire into whether the changes were justified
for reasons other than eradicating confusion.
182. See infra Part II.B.2.
183. The two SEC Commissioners who disagreed with the publication of the Section 913 Study
questioned whether a new rule would achieve its desired outcome. Casey & Paredes, supra note 16.
184. Wall Street and Fiduciary Duties: Can Jail Time Serve as an Adequate Deterrent for Willful
Violations, Hearings Before the S. Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs, 111th Cong. 1 (2010) (statement
of Larry E. Ribstein, Mildred Van Voorhis Jones Chair, University of Illinois College of Law)
(“ʽFiduciary duty’ is one of the most amorphous concepts in the law.”); Langevoort, supra note 7, at
456 (“[A]n open-ended broker fiduciary obligation is so loaded with unanswered questions that
baseline predictability would come slowly, if at all.”). The 2009 edition of Black’s Law Dictionary
includes an observation after the definition of fiduciary that the term is a “vague term, and it has
been pressed into service for a number of ends.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 702 (9th ed. 2009)
(quoting D.W.M. WATERS, THE CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST 4 (1964)).
185. SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 1, at 121–22.
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the fiduciary standard is not monolithic and can vary depending on the
type of relationship.186 The Department of Labor regulates advice by
financial services professionals to employee benefit plans, participants,
and beneficiaries, with respect to plans sponsored by private-sector
employers under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA). The ERISA fiduciary standard is higher than the
Advisers Act standard.187 As a result, total clarity would not be achieved
by applying a fiduciary duty to broker-dealers.188
B.

Inconsistent Standards Are an Insufficient Basis to Support
Regulatory Harmonization

1.

Advocates of a Fiduciary Duty Claim Inconsistent Standards
Justify Regulatory Harmonization

As discussed in Part I, brokers’ roles have transformed over the past
decades.189 The importance of trade execution has receded and advice
has become predominant. As a result, many brokers have become the
functional equivalent of investment advisers. They hold themselves out
as advisers, provide investment advice, and charge an asset-based fee.190
According to the 2009 Treasury Department White Paper, “investment

186. See Chi. Title Ins. Co. v. Runkel Abstract & Title Co., 610 F. Supp. 2d 973, 979 (W.D. Wis.
2009) (explaining that fiduciary duties vary depending on the type of relationship).
187. The duty of loyalty under ERISA, for example, is a duty to act for the exclusive purpose of
providing plan benefits. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary,” 75 Fed. Reg. 65263, 65264 (proposed
Oct. 22, 2010) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510) (temporarily withdrawn on Sept. 19, 2011).
This is a “sole interest” test similar to the test in trust law. The standard in the Advisers Act is a
“best interest” standard. Another difference is the scope of prohibited conduct. Under the Advisers
Act, potentially harmful conduct is generally not prohibited, it must be disclosed. By contrast,
Congress in ERISA supplemented general duties placed on ERISA fiduciaries with certain
categorical prohibitions on their activity, which no amount of disclosure can cure. Id. If a person
selling securities to a plan were a plan fiduciary, the sales transaction would generally be prohibited,
absent an exemption. Under the Advisers Act, however, principal transactions are permitted with
appropriate disclosure and consent. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(3) (2006).
188. Professor Thomas Hazen has written that an explicit declaration of a fiduciary duty without
more would merely add confusion to existing law. Hazen, Are Existing Stock Broker Standards
Sufficient? Principles, Rules, and Fiduciary Duties, supra note 19, at 715. The U.S. Department of
Labor is currently working on a fiduciary standard for advisers to accounts governed by ERISA.
The DOL standard will likely differ from the standard imposed on advisers under the Advisers Act.
See Ensuring Appropriate Regulatory Oversight of Broker-Dealers and Legislative Proposals to
Improve Investment Adviser Oversight, Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t
Sponsored Enters., 112th Cong. 6 (2011) (statement of Financial Services Roundtable), available at
http://financialservices.house.gov/Calendar/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=258252.
189. See supra Part I.D.3.
190. See Roper, supra note 177, at 3.

Laby - FINAL Word.docx (Do Not Delete)

742

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

11/1/2012 11:20 AM

[Vol. 87:707

advisers and broker-dealers are regulated under different statutory and
regulatory frameworks, even though the services they provide often are
virtually identical from a retail investor’s perspective.”191 In fact, the
financial media often refer to “investment advisers” when writing about
both broker-dealers and advisers.192 Under a functional approach to
regulation, two groups of people performing the same function should be
regulated by the same standard.
Consistent regulation has particular appeal for brokers and advisers.
88% of investment adviser representatives are also registered
representatives of broker-dealer firms.193 It makes little sense, one might
argue, to apply two sets of rules to individuals who both provide advice
in a similar manner. If an individual can wear an adviser hat one moment
and a broker hat the next, even though his activity has not changed,
regulation ought not to change either. Advocates argue that inconsistent
regulation for what appears to be the same activity justifies harmonizing
the regulation.
2.

Existence of Inconsistent Standards Is Not a Compelling Argument
for Regulatory Harmonization

The plea for consistency assumes that it makes no difference who is
performing a given function—the function itself matters most. This
assumption is not always valid. In the case of brokers and advisers,
although they both provide advice, they perform other activities too, and
these differences justify different treatment. In the Section 913 Study, the
SEC staff noted that differences in the regulation of brokers and advisers
reflect differences in function.194 Dealers, for example, accumulate
inventory in their own accounts to make markets in securities. Making
markets is critical to liquidity and encourages investment.195 An
investor’s knowledge that a future buyer for a security exists increases
his willingness to enter the market. The fact that broker-dealers are
willing to assume this market-making role might justify imposing a
lower duty, particularly if an enhanced duty might inhibit dealers from
assuming the role.196 Investment advisers cannot perform this market191. TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 13, at 71.
192. Michael A. Pollock, How to Find Low-Cost Investment Help, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2012, at
C10.
193. SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 1, at 12.
194. Id. at iii.
195. Robert B. Thompson, Market Makers and Vampire Squid: Regulating Securities Markets
After the Financial Meltdown, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 323, 342 (2011).
196. See SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 1, at 119.
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making function because, as mentioned above, their ability to trade from
their own accounts is strictly limited.197 The disparate regulatory
treatment of brokers and advisers recognizes the different roles they play
and helps ensure that brokers will continue to perform functions that
advisers do not or cannot perform.
Moreover, as with investor confusion, imposing a fiduciary duty on
brokers is unlikely to resolve the problem of inconsistent regulation.
Multiple regulators supervise financial institutions at both the federal
and state level. Even with harmonization, securities, insurance, and bank
regulators will each supervise advice about products falling under their
jurisdiction. Moreover, as mentioned, the ERISA fiduciary standard is
higher than the Advisers Act standard. Imposing a fiduciary duty on
brokers that give advice will not streamline inconsistent regulation.
Finally, the goal of consistency does not justify raising brokers’
standards any more than it justifies lowering advisers’ standards. An
argument for consistency is an argument for the same standard to be
applied to both brokers and advisers. This justification alone, like the
others, is not sufficiently compelling to raise the standard applicable to
brokers.
C.

Ineffective Standards Are an Insufficient Basis to Support a
Fiduciary Obligation

1.

Advocates of a Fiduciary Duty Claim that Ineffective Standards
Justify Regulatory Harmonization

Advocates of regulatory harmonization maintain that the standard of
conduct imposed on broker-dealers is too weak and should be
strengthened.198 Imposing a fiduciary standard would provide more
investor protection than a suitability standard.199 According to this

197. See supra Part I.B.2.
198. Letter from David G. Tittsworth, Exec. Dir., Investment Adviser Ass’n, to Elizabeth M.
Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 8 (Aug. 30, 2010) [hereinafter Tittsworth Letter] (on
file with author) (“The suitability standard falls short of the breadth of the fiduciary duty.”); Reza
Dibadj, Brokers, Fiduciaries and a Beginning, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 205, 213 (2010)
(justifying enhanced standard for brokers based on loyalty); Varnavides, supra note 19, at 218
(“[B]roker-dealer customers are afforded less protection than investment adviser customers because
broker-dealers are generally not held to a fiduciary standard.”).
199. Ensuring Appropriate Regulatory Oversight of Broker-Dealers and Legislative Proposals to
Improve Investment Adviser Oversight, Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t
Sponsored Enters., 112th Cong. 8 (2011) (statement of David G. Tittsworth, Executive Director and
Executive
Vice
President,
Investment
Adviser
Association),
available
at
http://financialservices.house.gov/Calendar/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=258252.
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argument, the fiduciary standard is the highest standard under the law
and, if applied to broker-dealers, it would strengthen investor protection.
Advocates of a fiduciary standard have argued that differences between
the duties imposed on brokers and advisers are significant. They argue
that advisers’ obligations under the Advisers Act, which flow from a
fiduciary duty, include the following: (i) have a reasonable basis for
providing advice, (ii) seek best execution, (iii) provide advice that is
suitable, (iv) avoid placing the adviser’s interests before the client’s, (v)
avoid using client assets for the adviser’s own purposes, (vi) maintain
client confidentiality, and (vii) disclose all material facts, including
material conflicts of interest.200 In addition, advisers are regulated more
extensively than broker-dealers in other areas, such as disclosure, use of
solicitors, pay-to-play, proxy voting, and registration and licensing.201
The regulation of broker-dealers is arguably less demanding. Unlike
advisers, brokers generally do not operate under a federal fiduciary duty
and are not subject to the strictures of SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc.202 Although brokers may be deemed fiduciaries in certain
situations,203 the duty is contingent upon the actual relationship. Absent
a special relationship, brokers are held to a standard of suitability.
According to advocates of a fiduciary standard, this difference is
important because a broker can recommend a security that is suitable
though not necessarily in the customer’s best interest.204 Regulators,
academics, and industry groups concur that the fiduciary standard
provides more investor protection than a suitability standard.205
2.

Existence of Ineffective Standards Is Not a Compelling Argument
for Regulatory Harmonization

There are at least three reasons why the claim that a broker’s standard
of conduct is weaker than an adviser’s does not alone justify imposing a
fiduciary duty. First, the duties and obligations imposed on brokers are
not insubstantial. Although advisers regulated under the Advisers Act
are held to a fiduciary standard, the Act’s regulation is not necessary for
imposing a fiduciary duty and some courts hold that brokers are

200. Id.; Tittsworth Letter, supra note 198, at 5.
201. Tittsworth Letter, supra note 198, at app. A.
202. See supra Part I.C.
203. See supra Part I.C.
204. Tittsworth, supra note 199, at 10; see supra Introduction.
205. Tittsworth, supra note 199, at 10–11; Tittsworth Letter, supra note 198, at 8 n.23 (collecting
citations to Congressional testimony).
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fiduciaries.206 Moreover, the suitability standard referenced above is
only one example of brokers’ duties. Under Section 15 of the Exchange
Act, brokers must register with the SEC and most broker-dealers must
register with FINRA. Section 15 also contains detailed antifraud
provisions. The antifraud rules applicable to broker-dealers include
prohibitions on market manipulation, high-pressure sales tactics,
deceptive recommendations, generation of excessive commissions,
unauthorized trading, and abuse of customer funds.207 Brokers are also
subject to the shingle theory.208 And FINRA rules provide a catch-all,
requiring that brokers adhere to “just and equitable principles of
trade.”209 According to Professor Thomas Hazen, an authority on
securities regulation, imposing a fiduciary duty on brokers without more
is unlikely to impose significantly greater duties on brokers.210 Of the
seven adviser obligations specified above, all but two (avoiding using
client assets for the adviser’s own purposes and disclosing material
conflicts of interest) are generally applicable to brokers.
Second, assuming that the suitability standard is lower, the mere
existence of a lower standard is not a basis to raise it. To the extent
brokers and advisers perform different functions as discussed above,211
there may be good reasons why the standard of liability for brokers is
weaker. Imposing a fiduciary obligation would raise the standard of
conduct, but it would also hinder brokers’ ability to engage in certain
activity, such as principal trading. Even strong supporters of a fiduciary
standard have recognized that applying the prophylactic rules in the
Advisers Act, particularly those governing principal trading, raises
concerns when applied to brokers.212 As the persistence of the principal
trading issue demonstrates, imposing a suitability standard as opposed to
a fiduciary standard might be an acceptable tradeoff between market
efficiency and investor protection.213 This point is one instantiation of
206. MidAmerica Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 886 F.2d 1249, 1258
(10th Cir. 1989); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1026 (6th Cir. 1979).
207. Hazen, Are Existing Stock Broker Standards Sufficient? Principles, Rules, and Fiduciary
Duties, supra note 19, at 733–34.
208. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
209. Hazen, Are Existing Stock Broker Standards Sufficient? Principles, Rules, and Fiduciary
Duties, supra note 19, at 735.
210. Id. at 715–16.
211. See supra Part II.B.2.
212. Roper, supra note 17, at 6.
213. The ability to trade as a principal is essential to the activity of broker-dealers. At the same
time, trading as a principal absent express disclosure and consent is fundamentally inconsistent with
acting as a fiduciary. See Laby, supra note 19, at 425–29. After years of discussing regulatory
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the broader principle that determining the optimal level of investor
protection is a matter of finding a tolerable level of investor
dissatisfaction. At some point, the benefit from imposing additional
safeguards does not outweigh the additional costs.214
Finally, a higher standard is not necessarily a better standard. If
higher were always better, then one ought to raise the standard of
conduct applicable to brokers and advisers to the highest possible level.
This makes little sense. Compare the standards imposed on advisers
under the Advisers Act to those under ERISA. Although advisers face a
high standard under the Advisers Act, an ERISA standard would be
higher still.215 If a higher standard were necessarily a better standard, it
would follow that the Advisers Act standard should be enhanced to an
ERISA standard. Even proponents of a fiduciary duty for brokers would
not recommend a change to an ERISA standard.
D.

Purported Economic Benefits Are an Insufficient Basis to Support
a Fiduciary Standard

1.

Advocates of a Fiduciary Standard Claim Economic Benefits
Justify Regulatory Harmonization

Advocates claim a fiduciary standard will benefit investors more than
it will cost them.216 This argument, unlike the others, is strictly
utilitarian. Although supporters of a fiduciary standard admit that
benefits to investors are difficult to quantify, one such supporter has
estimated that economic harm from advice given under a suitability
standard could amount to tens of billions of dollars per year if not
more.217 Imposing a fiduciary standard, therefore, could yield significant

harmonization, there remains a dearth of proposals on how to address principal trading if a fiduciary
duty were imposed on broker-dealers. Broker-dealers seek to preserve their ability to engage in
principal trading. SIFMA Framework Letter, supra note 18, at 23. In response, adviser groups state
that the SEC should examine the approach for brokers and advisers alike. Roper, supra note 17, at
15. The SEC staff indicated in the SECTION 913 STUDY that this issue would have to be settled by
the Commission itself. SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 1, at 120.
214. This type of analysis was implicit in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), where the
Supreme Court held that the optimal level of due process before a deprivation of property could
occur turned on the value of the property, the cost of the procedural safeguard, and the chance of a
wrongful deprivation because of the lack of the safeguard. Id.
215. See supra note 187.
216. See, e.g., MERCER BULLARD, AARP PUB. POLICY INST., PROTECTING INVESTORS—
ESTABLISHING THE SEC FIDUCIARY DUTY STANDARD 19 (2011), available at
http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/ppi/cons-prot/rr2011-02.pdf.
217. Roper, supra note 177, at 19.
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investor savings. Under a fiduciary standard, a broker must choose an
investment product in the investor’s best interest. For example, where
several mutual funds are similar in risk, performance, and other
characteristics, and all could be suitable for the customer, a broker
would be required to consider which fund has the lowest fees and
expenses.218 Investors would benefit from a fiduciary standard if it led
sponsors of financial products to compete on the basis of merit as
opposed to permitting consideration of which products resulted in more
generous compensation to the broker.219
A recent case that illustrates the potential benefits of a fiduciary
standard is Thomas v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.220 This case is a
good example of personalized investment advice provided by a broker to
a retail customer.221 In Thomas, a broker-dealer registered representative,
who was also a representative of an insurance company, advised a
customer to purchase a proprietary variable life insurance policy.222 A
variable life insurance policy is regulated as a security because the
investment risk falls on the annuitant.223 MetLife compensates its
representatives to sell proprietary products and can terminate employees
when they fail to meet a sales target.224 The plaintiffs in Thomas alleged
that the MetLife representative breached his fiduciary duty by failing to
disclose the conflicts of interest created by the company’s commission

218. Id. at 10; see supra Introduction.
219. Roper, supra note 177, at 9, 18. Certain brokers allegedly favor their own firm’s products
even when competitors offer better options. See Craig & Silver-Greenberg, Former Brokers Say
JPMorgan Favored Selling Bank’s Own Funds Over Others, supra note 20; Craig & SilverGreenberg. Many Regulators Put Their Attention on How JPMorgan Marketed its Funds, supra
note 20. In addition, several studies and reports suggest that conflicts of interest harm investors. See
GAO, 401(K) PLANS: IMPROVED REGULATION COULD BETTER PROTECT PARTICIPANTS FROM
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST (2011); GAO, PRIVATE PENSIONS: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST CAN AFFECT
DEFINED BENEFIT AND DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS (2009); Mercer Bullard, Geoff Friesen &
Travis Sapp, Investor Timing and Fund Distribution Channels (June 2008) (unpublished), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1070545; Xinge Zhao, The Role of Brokers and Financial Advisors
Behind Investments Into Load Funds (Dec. 2005) (unpublished), available at
http://www.ceibs.edu/knowledge/papers/images/20060317/2845.pdf. A fiduciary standard would
address conflicts of interest and, therefore, might reduce or eliminate the harms discussed. These
studies and reports, however, are not specifically tied to implementing a fiduciary duty for brokers
that give advice to retail customers, and one cannot assume that the harms set forth would be
eliminated by adopting a new fiduciary standard under Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Act.
220. 631 F.3d 1153 (10th Cir. 2011).
221. Id. at 1157.
222. Id.
223. SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am., 359 U.S. 65, 71 (1959).
224. Thomas, 631 F.3d at 1157.
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structure, fees, job-retention policies, and other incentives.225 The
plaintiffs sought restitution of commissions and fees allegedly paid in
exchange for advice, including insurance premiums insofar as the
premiums included commissions and fees.226 The court, however, held
that the representative’s advice was solely incidental to brokerage.227 He
was not acting as an investment adviser and not subject to a fiduciary
duty.
Thomas presents precisely the situation that would be covered by a
new fiduciary duty. Had the representative in this case been subject to a
fiduciary standard, he would have been required to disclose conflicts of
interest regarding his incentive to sell a proprietary product and the
customer may have avoided the investment.228
2.

Economic Benefits of a Fiduciary Standard Do Not Necessarily
Outweigh Costs

Although investor benefits from a fiduciary standard may be
significant, they are unsubstantiated. In opposing the release of the
Section 913 Study, two Commissioners stated that the Study did not
account sufficiently for the potential cost of imposing a fiduciary
standard, and insisted instead that the Section 913 Study should be a
starting point for further research.229 The Commissioners explained that
the Study discounted the concern that, as a result of new burdens
imposed on brokers, investors would have fewer professionals to choose
from, would have fewer products and services available to them, and
may have to pay more for the services they receive. They argued that
without additional data on investor preferences, the SEC was unable to
assess the costs of imposing a fiduciary standard.230 The dissenting
Commissioners were not opposed to a fiduciary obligation, but thought
more data was essential before moving forward.
Some argue that the costs of a new fiduciary duty would outweigh the
benefits.231 A 2010 study prepared by Oliver Wyman, a management
consulting firm, assessed the impacts of a new fiduciary standard on
225. Thomas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV-07-0121-F, 2008 WL 4619822, at *1 (W.D. Okla.
Oct. 16, 2008).
226. Id.
227. Thomas, 631 F.3d at 1167.
228. Hazen, Stock Broker Fiduciary Duties and the Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 19,
at 53.
229. Casey & Paredes, supra note 16.
230. Id.
231. See Allen, supra note 19, at 12 (noting potential costs to implementing a fiduciary standard).
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consumer choice, product access, and affordability of advisory
services.232 The study found that a new fiduciary obligation on brokers
could result in reduced access to investment advice, to products
distributed primarily through brokers, and to other affordable investment
options.233 The study found that the additional compliance costs could
cause twelve to seventeen million small investors to lose access to their
current level of advisory services.234 Investor returns could also be
negatively affected. According to the study, a current expected return on
a customer account would fall from 4.06% to 3.63% if a fiduciary
standard were imposed.235 Harmonization proponents strongly criticized
Oliver Wyman’s analysis and regard it with little weight.236
To date, there is no clear consensus on the economic benefits of a
fiduciary standard. Costs and benefits of proposed rules are difficult to
measure, data is scarce, and studies are open to critique.237 As a result,
economic benefits alone are an insufficient basis thus far to support a
232. OLIVER WYMAN, STANDARD OF CARE HARMONIZATION: IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR SEC
(2010), available at http://www.sifma.org/issues/item.aspx?id=21999.
233. Id. at 4.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 28.
236. Fiduciary proponents argue that the Oliver Wyman analysis assumed elimination of the
broker-dealer exclusion from the Advisers Act. Financial Planning Coalition, supra note 170, at 7.
Eliminating the broker-dealer exclusion in its entirety—an event which is unlikely to occur—would
subject brokers to all of the Investment Advisers Act, not only a fiduciary duty. The Senate
Committee considered such an action in draft legislation. This language, however, was not enacted
as part of the final bill. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong.,
Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009: Chairman’s Mark Text (2009) (on file with
author). Moreover, in the Section 913 Study, the SEC staff recommended that Congress not repeal
the exclusion. SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 1, at 139–40. The analysis also assumed that brokers
would be disabled from charging commissions, even though a fiduciary standard does not itself
prohibit doing so. Finally, the Wyman analysis assumed that a fiduciary standard would restrict the
sale of proprietary products and prohibit the sale of products on a principal basis. The Dodd-Frank
Act, however, did not prohibit principal transactions or the sale of proprietary products. Indeed, the
latter was explicitly permitted. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 14, § 913(g)(1).
237. In a recent Department of Labor (DOL) rule proposal to expand the definition of the term
investment adviser “fiduciary” under ERISA rules, the DOL acknowledged the difficulty of
quantifying the benefits associated with the eradication of conflicts of interest. Instead, under a
heading of qualitative benefits, the DOL wrote that given the magnitude of the assets at stake in
ERISA plans, even a small value improvement in a moderate number of plans could result in
economically significant benefits. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary,” 75 Fed. Reg. 65263, 65270
(proposed Oct. 22, 2010) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510) (temporarily withdrawn on Sept. 19,
2011). SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro outlined steps the SEC is taking to understand the economic
effects of imposing a fiduciary duty on brokers. Chairman Schapiro stated that the SEC staff is
drafting a public request for information to obtain data on regulatory alternatives. Letter from Mary
L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to Representative Scott Garrett, Chairman,
Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. (Jan. 10, 2012), available at
http://www.mfdf.org/images/uploads/blog_files/Garrett_1-10-12.pdf.
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fiduciary standard. Although the SEC is under pressure to give more
consideration to the economic costs and benefits of proposed rules, it is
unlikely that economic benefits alone will serve as a complete
justification to implement a new fiduciary standard.238 The justification
will have to be based largely on non-economic grounds.
E.

Empirical Expectations Are an Insufficient Basis to Support a
Fiduciary Standard

1.

Advocates of a Fiduciary Standard Claim that Investor
Expectations Justify Regulatory Harmonization

The investor expectations claim is similar in some respects to the
investor confusion claim. Although brokers are held to a standard of
suitability, investors expect that brokers are held to a fiduciary standard.
The Section 913 Study opened by stating that investors rely on brokers
and advisers for advice and expect advice to be in investors’ best
interest.239 That brokers are not held to a fiduciary standard may be
disclosed in the fine print. Investors, however, should not have to parse
through legalese to learn that they are receiving advice inconsistent with
their expectations.240
The investor expectations claim appears to rely on empirical evidence
about their actual expectations.241 Supporters of the fiduciary standard
238. Although no statute requires the SEC to engage in a cost-benefit analysis, it has done so
since the 1980s as a matter of good regulatory practice. Economic Analysis in SEC Rulemaking:
Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on TARP, Financial Services and Bailouts of Public and Private
Programs, 112th Cong. 4–5 (2012) (statement of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n), available at http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/4-17-12-SchapiroTestimony.pdf. Where benefits cannot be monetized, agencies are expected to account for
compliance costs with proposed rules and compare them with qualitative benefits. Robert Litan,
Regulation,
in
THE
CONCISE
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF
ECONOMICS,
available
at
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Regulation.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2012). When engaged in
certain types of rulemaking, the SEC must consider whether the action will promote efficiency,
competition, and capital formation. Securities Act § 2(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78b(b) (2006); Securities
Exchange Act §§ 3(f), 23(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(f), 78w(a)(2) (2006); Investment Company Act
§ 2(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(c) (2006). Some in the financial services industry have successfully
argued that the SEC acted arbitrarily in adopting certain rules because it failed to determine their
likely economic consequences and to connect those consequences to efficiency, competition, and
capital formation. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Am. Equity
Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 179 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412
F.3d 133, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2005). These decisions have placed pressure on the SEC to provide a
robust cost-benefit analysis to support its rules.
239. SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 1, at i.
240. Id. at 101, 107; see also Financial Planning Coalition, supra note 170, at 3.
241. SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 1, at 101.
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point to a survey by ORC International,242 which showed responders
were as likely to believe that financial advisors (a title used by brokerdealer registered representatives) were fiduciaries as they were to
believe that financial planners and investment advisers were
fiduciaries.243 Similarly, the Rand Report referred to a TD Ameritrade
survey, which found that more than 60% of respondents believed
brokers have a fiduciary duty and 90% of respondents believed that
advisers owe a fiduciary duty.244
The expectations argument is related to the confusion argument in the
sense that if investors expect brokers are fiduciaries, then investors are
confused about brokers’ actual responsibilities. One proponent of a
fiduciary standard has joined the confusion claim and the expectation
claim, stating that brokers have marketed themselves as advisers,
resulting in customer confusion and, at the same time, vitiating customer
expectations.245 Although it might be tempting to group the confusion
and the expectations arguments together, the expectations argument is
different from the confusion argument and merits a separate response.
Investors who expect brokers to be fiduciaries may not view their beliefs
as confused at all. Investor expectations, the argument goes, justify a
change in the law to align it with their expectations regardless of
whether the expectations are a source of confusion.246
2.

Empirical Expectations Do Not Themselves Justify a Fiduciary
Duty for Brokers

Empirical expectations alone do not justify a fiduciary duty. First, just
as with investor confusion, it would be illogical to change the status quo
so that it became consistent with investors’ expectations, absent an
independent reason that one’s expectations should be met.247 In other
words, before determining that expectations are a reason to change the
242. Roper, supra note 177, at 5.
243. Id.
244. RAND REPORT, supra note 84, at 31.
245. Tittsworth Letter, supra note 198, at 10.
246. Other survey data cited to support the claim about investor expectations is less persuasive.
ORC Survey responders also stated that if a broker and adviser provide the same services, they
should have to follow the same rules. The person providing advice, survey responders said, “should
put your interests ahead of theirs.” Roper, supra note 177, at 5 (quoting INFOGROUP/ORC, U.S.
INVESTORS & THE FIDUCIARY STANDARD 18 (2010)). This survey response, however, is not really
about investor expectations; this question asks individuals about what the law should be. Investors’
normative views of the law are not the same as cataloguing their expectations of what the law
actually is.
247. See supra Part II.A.2.
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law, one needs an account for why investors have such expectations and
whether they are worth vindicating. As explained above, there may be
good reasons to permit brokers to operate under a non-fiduciary
standard, even if that standard does not comport with investors’
expectations.248
An analogy might be helpful. Take the case of airline passengers
whose flight is canceled and the next departing fight is the following
day. Those passengers likely expect a voucher for one night’s lodging or
some other form of compensation. The fact that passengers expect to
receive a voucher under these circumstances is not necessarily a reason
to require it. (Similarly, the fact that passengers do not expect a voucher
is not a reason not to provide one.) One can look to other considerations,
such as the airline’s cost of providing vouchers and passengers’ cost of
not receiving them. Many relevant considerations apart from customers’
empirical expectations would enter into a decision to impose a voucher
requirement.
It may be more profitable to view the argument about expectations as
an argument about reasonable expectations. Perhaps those advocating a
fiduciary standard based on expectations are really making an argument
about reasonable expectations and invoking survey results and other
empirical data to support a reasonable expectations claim. In other
words, the fact that investors actually expect a broker to operate under a
fiduciary standard gives a reasonable expectations claim empirical
support. Something more than empirical expectations, however, is
required to give rise to reasonable expectations.
Look again at the analogy: If a particular airline has a practice of
dispensing vouchers when canceling evening flights, and if a passenger
has received such vouchers in the past, the passenger might have a
strong expectation that he will receive a voucher when his evening flight
is canceled. The passenger’s expectation, however, would not give rise
to an entitlement. However, if this airline held itself out as the airline
that assures on-time departures, then one could craft an argument about
reasonable expectations based on the airline’s own claim, which has
little to do with empirical expectations. The question is whether the
airline has done something to strengthen the justificatory force of the
passenger’s expectation.249 In the new analogy, the airline has arguably
induced the passenger to choose it over competing airlines by assuring
on-time departures.
248. See supra Part II.C.2.
249. Catherine Mitchell, Leading a Life of its Own? The Roles of Reasonable Expectation in
Contract Law, 23 O.J.L.S. 639, 656 (2003).
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A comparable distinction between empirical and reasonable
expectations is important to the doctrine of apparent authority in agency
law. Apparent authority is the power held by an agent to affect a
principal’s legal relations with third parties when a third party
“reasonably believes” the agent has authority to act on the principal’s
behalf, and the belief is traceable to the principal’s manifestations.250 It
is not enough for apparent authority that a third person empirically
believes that an actor was authorized by a principal; the belief must be
reasonable.
Supporters of a fiduciary standard appear to rely on empirical
expectations, not reasonable expectations. Although the Section 913
Study stated that investors have a “reasonable expectation” that advice
they are receiving is in their best interest,251 it provided little or no
foundation for reasonable expectations other than empirical
expectations.252 As discussed more fully in Part III, empirical
expectations alone do not justify a change in the law; reasonable
expectations may provide a better argument.
This Part has shown that the conventional arguments for placing a
fiduciary duty on brokers that provide advice are incomplete and do not
alone justify a new fiduciary obligation. Investor confusion, inconsistent
standards, ineffective standards, and economic benefits appear to be
plausible arguments, but after careful consideration, each fails to fully
support a fiduciary duty. The last argument, investor expectations, is
most persuasive, but a stronger argument turns on reasonable
expectations, not empirical expectations.
III. REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS JUSTIFY A FIDUCIARY
OBLIGATION FOR BROKER-DEALERS
This Part puts forth a justification for placing a fiduciary duty on
brokers that give personalized advice to retail customers. While the
conventional justifications for a fiduciary obligation are not compelling,
this Part argues that a broker-dealer’s use of advertisements and titles
replete with advice language gives rise to a reasonable expectation that
the broker will operate under a fiduciary standard. Reasonable
expectations have consequences for regulation as well as under the
common law. As a regulatory matter, use of advertisements and titles
justifies a new administrative rule imposing a fiduciary standard. Under
250. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (2006).
251. SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 1, at 101.
252. Id.; see also Financial Planning Coalition, supra note 170, at 3.
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the common law, reasonable expectations can ground a fiduciary
obligation for broker-dealers that give personalized investment advice to
retail customers. Reasonable expectations of the parties provide a more
complete justification for a fiduciary standard than those reasons already
put forth.253
A.

Broker-Dealers Employ Advertisements and Titles Promoting the
Advisory Function

This section begins by reviewing advertisements by broker-dealers
over the past decades and shows how they have evolved by increasingly
emphasizing advice. This section is not a comprehensive survey of
brokers’ advertisements. It shows anecdotally that brokers advertise
independent, objective advice. This section will also discuss studies that
have examined broker-dealer advertising and support the conclusions
drawn from the anecdotes.
Historically, brokerage firms resisted advertising. Advertising was
viewed as unrefined and inconsistent with the patrician image the firms
sought to promote.254 Historian Edwin J. Perkins has suggested that
brokerage firms initially resisted advertising to maintain a de facto cartel
and avoid destructive competition amongst themselves.255 This
resistance changed to some degree with Merrill Lynch’s decision to
break ranks and advertise in the 1940s.256 After Merrill Lynch began to
advertise, the NYSE encouraged the practice through its “Own Your
Share of American Business” campaign, which ran from 1954 to

253. The argument from reasonable expectations does not depend on the outcome of a traditional
cost-benefit analysis. A robust cost-benefit analysis regarding imposing a fiduciary duty on brokers
that give advice is difficult to complete because the benefits are diffuse and hard to measure, and
good estimates of the costs are difficult to obtain. The analysis, therefore, does not turn on a
traditional cost-benefit analysis. The argument relies instead on reasonable expectations that brokerdealers have created over the years through marketing and advertising. One determines reasonable
expectations based on a variety of factors. This is not to say that costs and benefits of imposing a
fiduciary duty are irrelevant. In fact, the reasonableness of an expectation is determined in part by
the social consequences of imposing liability based on the expectation. For example, if an
electronics mart advertises televisions for $199, it cannot claim that the actual price is $250.
However, the store is not required to have an unlimited quantity available at the advertised price. A
reasonable person would know that quantity is limited. One’s analysis of reasonableness is based in
part on the social costs of requiring the store to stock an unlimited quantity. Thus, costs and benefits
are relevant to but not determinative of reasonableness.
254. EDWIN J. PERKINS, WALL STREET TO MAIN STREET: CHARLES MERRILL AND MIDDLECLASS INVESTORS 56–57, 201 (1999); Traflet & Coyne, supra note 97, at 136.
255. PERKINS, supra note 254, at 57.
256. Id. at 201. Charles Merrill drew from his deep involvement with Safeway Stores and
initiated an informational advertising campaign at Merrill Lynch. Id. at 12, 204–05.
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1968.257 In the late 1960s and early 1970s, advertising by the larger
firms began to target individual investors. One advertisement offered
“service to every investor, including the ‘little guy.’”258 Another focused
on “investment insight” applied to the “individual needs” of clients.259
By the early 1970s, several brokerage firms were enhancing their
advertising to appeal to the investment needs of small investors.
The elimination of fixed commissions in 1975 was a turning point in
brokerage advertising. First, as commission rates began to drop,
brokerage firms needed to advertise their new fee structures to win over
new customers and retain existing ones.260 Second, in 1976 and 1977,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that prohibitions on professional
advertising constituted a violation of the right of free speech under the
First Amendment.261 These developments led to widespread advertising
by many professionals, including brokers.262
As brokerage advertising developed, firms began to shift from use of
the terms “brokerage firm” or “stockbroker.” In the early 1980s, firms
often advertised in print media using the phrase “brokerage services.”263
Although a few firms started using the term “Account Executive” to
describe their registered representatives in the 1960s and early 1970s,264
other firms continued to use the term “stockbroker” through the early
1980s.265 Moreover, in the early 1980s, firms did not yet advertise
advice as their primary function, stating instead that accounts were
“serviced” by account executives, rather than “managed” or
“advised.”266
In the 1960s and 1970s a slow trend began whereby some firms’
advertisements began to use language suggestive of advice.267 In the

257. Janice Traflet, Spreading the Ideal of Mass Ownership: Public Relations and the NYSE, 22
ESSAYS ECON. & BUS. HIST. 257, 266–67 (2004).
258. See FORBES, Aug. 1, 1971, at 14 (Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc., advertisement).
259. See TIME, July 22, 1966, at 82 (Prudential Bache & Co., advertisement); see also TIME, Aug.
5, 1966, at 91 (Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, advertisement).
260. Traflet & Coyne, supra note 97, at 136.
261. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) (lawyers); Va. Pharmacy Bd. v.
Va. Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (pharmacists).
262. Traflet & Coyne, supra note 97, at 137.
263. See FORBES, Jan. 21, 1980, at 93 (Fidelity Brokerage Services, Inc., advertisement).
264. FORBES, Jan. 15, 1973, at 35 (Reynolds Securities, Inc., advertisement); TIME, July 1, 1966,
at 73 (Merrill Lynch, advertisement).
265. See FORBES, Apr. 25, 1983, at 45 (Kidder Peabody & Co., advertisement); FORBES, Jan. 21,
1980, at 93 (Fidelity Brokerage Services, Inc. advertisement).
266. FORBES, Apr. 11, 1983, at 189 (Merrill Lynch advertisement).
267. FORBES, Jan. 15, 1973, at 35 (Reynolds Securities, Inc. advertisement); FORBES, Aug. 1,
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early to mid 1980s, brokerage firms explicitly advertised advice and
financial planning. One firm referred to the “quality of investment
advice” it provided.268 “Total Financial Planning,” another firm
advertised, “requires a careful assessment of your entire financial
situation, and the assembling of a financial profile that forms the basis of
an approach to meet all your financial objectives.”269 By the mid-1980s,
firms used the title “Financial Consultant” to refer to broker-dealer
registered representatives.270 The term “consultant” suggested that the
firm was acting in an advisory capacity.271 In the 1990s, some firms
started using the title “Financial Advisor,” more explicitly suggesting an
advisory relationship.272
By the late 1980s, brokerage firms not only referred to their registered
representatives as Financial Consultants, they also encouraged investors
to talk to the Financial Consultant for “straight answers” and advertised
the Financial Consultant as a “valuable source of information,”
suggesting that the customer could turn to the representative for
advice.273 One advertisement from this period noted that the Financial
Consultant began the customer relationship by asking about long-term
goals and levels of risk, and setting priorities.274 Another stated that
individuals were seeking “answers, not sales talk.”275 Still another
exclaimed in large lettering: “Ask for investment help and we’ll answer.
In person.”276 By 1995, advertising advice by brokers was more
ubiquitous, with some firms advertising a close personal relationship
between the broker and the customer, including text and images
1971, at 14 (Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc., advertisement); TIME, July 22, 1966, at 76
(Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., advertisement).
268. BUS. WEEK, Apr. 18, 1986, at 3 (Drexel Burnham advertisement).
269. FORBES, Apr. 25, 1983, at 89 (Prudential Bache Securities advertisement).
270. FORBES, Oct. 2, 1989, at 97 (Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., advertisement);
BUS. WEEK, July 21, 1986, at 109 (Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith advertisement); FORBES,
July 14, 1986, at 1 (Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith advertisement); FORBES, Apr. 8, 1985, at
145 (Shearson Lehman Brothers Inc., advertisement).
271. A definition of consultant is “[a] person qualified to give professional advice or
services . . . an adviser.” OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Online ed. March 2012), available at
http://oed.com/view/Entry/39956?redirectedFrom=consultant#eid. Consultant is also defined as “a
person who gives professional or expert advice.” Id.
272. FORBES, Apr. 20, 1998, at 75 (Prudential Securities advertisement); FORBES, Apr. 6, 1998,
at 55 (Prudential Securities advertisement).
273. FORBES, Apr. 30, 1990, at 132 (Merrill Lynch advertisement); FORBES, July 14, 1986, at 1
(Merrill Lynch advertisement).
274. FORBES, July 14, 1986, at 1 (Merrill Lynch advertisement).
275. MONEY MAGAZINE, Apr. 1989, at S5 (Fidelity advertisement).
276. MONEY MAGAZINE, Mar. 1989, at 148 (First Investors advertisement).
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demonstrating the broker’s concern and involvement with the customer’s
family members.277 One advertisement from that period referred
explicitly to the provision of “financial advice” and declared that more
clients “trusted” the firm with their assets than any other firm.278 A 2012
advertisement highlights, and has registered, the phrase: “So what do I
do with my money?”279
This evidence of broker advertising is not merely anecdotal.
According to the Rand Report, advertising campaigns by larger
brokerage firms often promoted experience in managing money.280
Investment advisers interviewed by Rand observed that brokers’
advertisements sounded as if they were selling advice. Brokers’
advertisements, the advisers said, portrayed a close relationship between
the firm and the customer by using imagery such as a broker attending a
customer’s family function or a broker and customer walking down the
beach together.281 Although advisers’ views about brokers may be
colored by competition, these reports corroborate the emphasis on
personalized advice in the examples above.282
According to the Rand Report, use of titles also connotes an advisory
relationship. The most commonly reported title for a registered
representative was “financial advisor.”283 Other typical titles included
“financial consultant,” “financial representative,” “investment
specialist,”
“investment
representative,”
and
“registered
284
representative.” According to the Section 913 Study, these titles—
particularly financial advisor and financial consultant—strongly suggest
277. BUS. WEEK, May 3, 1993, at 123 (Paine Webber advertisement); BUS. WEEK, Apr. 5, 1993,
at 36 (Paine Webber advertisement); see also BUS. WEEK, Apr. 12, 1993, at 15 (Putman Inv.
Advertisement).
278. HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 25 (Merrill Lynch advertisement); see also FORBES,
Apr. 20, 1998, at 105 (Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. advertisement).
279. WALL ST. J., June 5, 2012, at A13 (BlackRock, Inc. advertisement).
280. RAND REPORT, supra note 84, at 70.
281. Id. at 71.
282. Mercedes M. Cardona & Hillary Chura, Morgan Stanley Pursues Younger, Well-Heeled
Investors: Brokerage Expands Its Target, Aims for the Internet-Savvy, 71 ADVERTISING AGE 3
(2000) (quoting ads emphasizing level of knowledge brokers bring to the relationship); Mercedes
M. Cardona, Paul Polito, 72 ADVERTISING AGE 29 (2001) (quoting Merrill Lynch executive stating
that the firm is trying to make people understand “there is no better time to get advice”);
Christopher Hosford, Financial Services Advertising Roars Back, B TO B, Aug. 16, 2010,
http://www.btobonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100816/FREE/308169986/0/SEARCH
(quoting Fidelity executive stating a recent ad campaign to emphasize the advisory role increased
brand preference by 66%).
283. RAND REPORT, supra note 84, at 91.
284. Id. at 74.

Laby - FINAL Word.docx (Do Not Delete)

758

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

11/1/2012 11:20 AM

[Vol. 87:707

that the individual will provide investment advice and counseling.
Moreover, use of these titles actually affected customers.285 Respondents
equated the titles financial advisor and financial consultant to an
investment adviser rather than a broker-dealer.286
The use of advertising and titles with advice language evokes a
personal connection that was historically the cornerstone of the advisory
relationship. Recall that the Advisers Act was intended to promote the
personal confidential relationship that existed between the adviser and
the client.287 In addition, the personal relationship promoted by
advertising triggers the authority in Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Act,
which is limited to the context of providing “personalized” investment
advice to retail customers.288 Although a cynic might view the terms
“adviser” or “consultant” as phatic discourse meant to create goodwill,
disregarding this language ignores the potential it has to induce
customers to act in response. Because the use of this language is
intentional, one should examine how it might bear on expectations.
B.

Broker Advertising Creates Reasonable Expectations to Receive
Advice

1.

Reasonable Expectations Can Ground a Right

A reasonable expectation is one element in the argument for a legal
right.289 A reasonable expectation implies in the first instance that a
person believes he has an entitlement to be treated in a certain way, and
that the belief is based on objective criteria.290 The expectation alone
does not demonstrate that the person has a legal right.291 The right is
based on a legal system’s recognition of reasonable expectations.292
Reasonable expectations are particularly important in the law of
agency. As discussed above, an agency relationship is formed under the
doctrine of apparent authority when a third party reasonably believes an
agent has authority to act on the principal’s behalf, and the belief is
285. Id. at 92.
286. Id.
287. See supra Part I.B.2.
288. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 14, § 913(f).
289. Mitchell, supra note 249, at 642.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 644. Mitchell inserts an intermediate step of legitimate expectation, which is situated
between reasonable expectation and legal entitlement. A legitimate expectation requires an
argument for recognizing one’s expectation as legitimate. Id.
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traceable to the principal’s manifestations.293 The purpose of the
apparent agency doctrine is to hold a principal accountable for the
results of a third party’s belief about an actor’s authority to act as an
agent, but only when the belief is reasonable and traceable to the
principal’s conduct. According to the Restatement (Third) of Agency,
reasonability can turn on, among other things, an industry and its
customs, a transaction that is conventionally done in a particular way, or
reasonable expectations based on analogous situations.294
Reasonable expectations are also important in the law of contract. The
primary purpose of contract law is the realization of reasonable
expectations induced by making a promise.295 Promises can be either
implied or express. If a person has reason to know that his words may
cause another to believe a promise is intended, and the promisee alters
her beliefs accordingly, a promise is legally made.296 A promise is “an
expression of commitment to act in a specified way communicated in
such a way that the addressee of the expression may justly expect
performance and may reasonably rely thereon.”297 The key question is
whether the addressee may justly expect performance. To determine
when an expectation is just, courts look to whether an expectation is
reasonable under the circumstances; contract law protects reasonable
expectations.298
2.

Several Criteria Can Determine Reasonable Expectations

Before examining whether advertisements and titles with advice
language create a reasonable expectation that brokers will provide
advice, one must first decide what serves as a basis for a reasonable
expectation. There are at least three possibilities: the contract itself, the
293. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (2006).
294. Id. § 2.03 cmt. d.
295. 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.1, at 2 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev.
ed. 1993).
296. Id. § 1.13, at 37.
297. Id. § 1.13, at 35.
298. Id. § 1.1, at 2–5. The same principle is captured by the definition of “offer.” According to
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, an offer is defined as “the manifestation of willingness to
enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to that
bargain is invited and will conclude it.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1981).
Again, the key question is whether the manifestation justifies another in assuming that his assent
will conclude a bargain. This answer turns on when a reasonable person would understand or expect
that a merchant manifests an intention to create a binding relationship. Jay M. Feinman & Stephen
R. Brill, Is an Advertisement an Offer? Why It Is, and Why It Matters, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 61, 77
(2006).
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parties’ empirical beliefs, and the parties’ normative expectations.
a.

The Contract Is One Basis for Determining Reasonable
Expectations

The first candidate to ground the parties’ reasonable expectations is
the contract itself. The best guide to the parties’ expectations is often
their own contractual language.299 Thus, a court’s primary concern is
often to determine the parties’ intentions as they are expressed in the
written contract.300 There are many contracts, however, that at least one
party neither reads nor understands. And even if the parties read and
understand the document, the parties may have numerous expectations
not embodied in the contract itself, particularly for standardized
agreements. Under conventional contract doctrine, a standardized
agreement is not necessarily given effect if its terms are at odds with the
reasonable expectations of the party who did not prepare it.301 As a
result, the contract alone can be insufficient as a source of reasonable
expectations.
b.

Empirical Expectations Form Another Basis for Determining
Reasonable Expectations

Empirical expectations are relevant, but they are not determinative of
reasonable expectations. The phrase “reasonable expectation” has two
parts, each of which is important. The word “expectation” refers to a
mental state, and is defined as the “forecasting [of] something to happen,
or anticipating something to be received; anticipation; a preconceived
idea or opinion with regard to what will take place.”302 One
characterization of expectation is “looking for something as one’s
due.”303 Expectation, therefore, connotes subjectivity.304 The other part
of reasonable expectations, “reasonable,” implies the presence of just or
299. See, e.g., Law Debenture Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Maverick Tube Corp., 595 F.3d 458, 467 (2d
Cir. 2010); Gibney v. Pillifant, 32 So.3d 784, 785 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
300. Albemarle Corp. v. MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 2d 652, 659 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
301. CORBIN, supra note 295, § 1.1, at 5; see A/S Apothekernes Laboratorium for
Specialpraeparater v. I.M.C. Chem. Grp., Inc., 873 F.2d 155, 157 (7th Cir. 1989) (“Courts look to
all of the circumstances surrounding the negotiations, including the actions of the principles both
during and after, to determine what the parties intended.”).
302. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 271, available at http://oed.com/view/Entry/
66455?redirectedFrom=expectation#eid.
303. Id.
304. Bailey H. Kuklin, The Plausibility of Legally Protecting Reasonable Expectations, 32 VAL.
U. L. REV. 19, 23–24 (1997).
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legitimate grounds for doing or believing something, as in “reasonable
cause” or “reasonable doubt.”305 Reasonable, therefore, connotes
objectivity or normativity.
While subjective expectations are relevant to reasonable expectations,
they are not conclusive. Whether an expectation is reasonable does not
turn on survey data of actual expectations.306 Expectations held by the
average investor, or even the majority of investors, are not necessarily
reasonable and, therefore, are insufficient to ground liability.307 A person
might expect an event to occur in the future simply because a similar
event has occurred in the past. As demonstrated with the airline
example, empirical expectations are both an insufficient basis to support
a claim of entitlement308 and a weak basis for liability.309
The importance of objectivity with regard to expectations was
established in the historical debate in contract law between the
subjectivists and objectivists. Subjectivists looked to the parties’ actual
assent to an agreement to determine whether a contract was in force.310
Objectivists looked to external or objective appearances of the parties’
intentions.311 As Learned Hand famously wrote, “[a] contract has,
strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent of
the parties.”312 Actual assent is not necessary for a court to find
reasonable expectations, or to find that a contract has been concluded.
Instead, the law protects reasonable expectations.313 Courts are not
indifferent to parties’ actual expectations but, as Arthur Corbin
explained in his classic treatise, justice is not served by enforcing every
result that either party may expect, or by not enforcing a result unless
both parties expect and intend the result.314
Similar principles apply when courts imply terms into a contract.

305. Id. at 24.
306. Feinman & Brill, supra note 298, at 77.
307. CORBIN, supra note 295, § 1.9, at 25 (“Agreement consists of mutual expressions; it does
not consist of harmonious intentions or states of mind.”); Feinman & Brill, supra note 298, at 77;
Mitchell, supra note 249, at 656.
308. See supra Part II.E.2.
309. Mitchell, supra note 249, at 656.
310. 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.6, at 208–10 (3d ed. 2004).
311. Id. § 3.6, at 209.
312. Hotchkiss v. Nat’l City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
313. FARNSWORTH, supra note 310, § 3.6, at 209–10.
314. CORBIN, supra note 295, § 1.9, at 26; see also P.D. Finn, The Fiduciary Principle, in T.G.
YOUDAN, EQUITY, FIDUCIARIES AND TRUSTS 6 (1989) (explaining that reasonable expectations are
a combination of actual expectations and “judicial prescription”).
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Parties rarely specify their entire agreement in advance.315 Courts often
are called upon to fill in missing terms, typically called “implied
terms.”316 In deciding which terms to imply, courts might look to actual
expectations of the parties even if not reduced to writing.317 But if the
parties’ expectations were different, or nonexistent, a court will
substitute an objective test, asking whether one party should have
reasonably understood the other’s expectation. According to the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, when contracting parties omit an
essential term, a court will supply a term that is “reasonable in the
circumstances.”318
Determining reasonable expectations requires looking at basic
principles to guide a court when moving from situations the parties
anticipated to situations they did not. The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts instructs a court to supply a term that “comports with
community standards of fairness and policy.”319 The difficult question is
determining which principles to use in making the determination of what
is fair or reasonable. If justice is served by enforcing a result where both
parties did not expect or intend the result, then something more than
empirical expectations is required to give force to reasonable
expectations.
c.

Normative Expectations Are a Further Basis for Determining
Reasonable Expectations

Normative rules or principles are necessary to give substance to the
otherwise vague notion of reasonableness where neither the contract nor
actual expectations can sufficiently ground reasonable expectations. Let
us explore what is meant by a normative rule or principle that might
ground expectations. One can distinguish between expectations that a
person has a good reason to have on the one hand, and expectations that
a person has a right to have on the other, because of a rule or principle
grounding that right.320 Consider expectations regarding traffic laws, for
example. People do not have an empirical expectation that all motorists
will follow traffic laws; it would be unreasonable to have such a starry315. Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the
Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 30 (1990).
316. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.16, at 483 (4th ed. 2004).
317. Id. § 7.16, at 485.
318. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 (1981).
319. Id. § 204 cmt. d.
320. JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 280 (1992).
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eyed view of one’s fellow drivers. Yet traffic laws give people
normative grounds to expect motorists to follow the rules of the road.
People have a normative expectation for compliance and act
accordingly.321
To strengthen the force of one’s expectation, one must rely on a rule
or principle. Because broker-dealers have been advertising themselves as
advisers, this inducement gives justificatory force to reasonable
expectations by virtue of an express or implied promise.322 This Article
does not argue that inducement through advertising or use of titles
provides proof that a legal contract has formed between an investor and
any particular brokerage firm. Rather, inducement provides normative
support for reasonable expectations.323 Consider the agency law analogy
in the doctrine of apparent authority discussed above.324 For apparent
authority to exist, the third party must reasonably believe the agent has
authority to act on behalf of the principal and the belief must be
traceable to the principal’s manifestations, analogous to an
inducement.325 Moreover, one should view brokers’ inducement in the
context of changes in the financial services industry discussed above,326
whereby advice has advanced and execution has receded in importance.
In that respect, advertisements are part of a broader picture that has
given rise to expectations that were not present in previous decades. The
next section explores inducement in more detail.

321. Id.
322. Mitchell, supra note 249, at 656.
323. Once one articulates a normative basis to support reasonable expectations, the original
notion of expectations recedes in importance. Articulating an independent principle to ground
expectations moves one away from the idea of expectations. A normative basis to support
reasonable expectations points to the fact that individuals should have such expectations because
there are good reasons for having them. If expectations depend on good reasons, and if the reasons
articulated count as good reasons, then one can largely ignore the notion of reasonable expectations
and ground an obligation on the reasons identified. COLEMAN, supra note 320, at 281; Mitchell,
supra note 249, at 657. This shift is a common theme when articulating hypothetical constructs,
such as hypothetical consent. The good reasons for grounding hypothetical consent are doing the
real work for requiring action or inaction, and reference to consent is hardly necessary. SHELLY
KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS 90 (1998).
324. See supra note 293–94 and accompanying text.
325. See supra note 293 and accompanying text; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY
§ 3.03 (explaining that the principal’s manifestation is the lynchpin of apparent agency).
326. See supra Part I.D.3.
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3.

Advertisements Induce Customers to Engage Broker-Dealer Firms

a.

Advertisements Are Important to Customers

Advertising advice and adviser titles induce individuals to contract
with broker-dealers and ground a reasonable expectation that a brokerdealer will provide advice. Advertising is the paid promotion of an idea,
cause, product, or service by an identified sponsor attempting to inform
and ultimately persuade a target audience into taking action.327 The
advertising by many brokerage firms is sometimes referred to as
institutional advertising because it takes a broad approach, emphasizing
the philosophy of a particular industry, and is often meant to engender
goodwill toward a product, service, or firm. Institutional advertising is
similar to public relations because both attempt to promote a positive
image.328 Advertising by broker-dealers can also take the form of
persuasive advertising typically used after a product or service has been
introduced to a customer. Persuasive advertising builds selective demand
for a product or service by promoting its special feature.329
Advertising is meant to reach specific customers at a particular time
and induce them to change their behavior.330 The SEC has stated that
regulating advertising is important because of the impact advertising has
on retail investors.331 FINRA regulates brokerage firm advertising,
which must be approved by a registered principal at the firm and, in
some cases, filed with FINRA.332 Regulating advertising comprises an
important aspect of FINRA’s program, which has a Department of
Advertising Regulation dedicated to the task.333
327. Allen D. Truell & Michael Milbier, Advertising, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BUSINESS AND
FINANCE 15 (Burton S. Kaliski ed., 2d ed. 2007); ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BUSINESS 6–7 (W.
Davis Folsom ed., 2004).
328. Truell & Milbier, supra note 327, at 17; ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BUSINESS, supra
note 327, at 6.
329. Truell & Milbier, supra note 327, at 17.
330. Id. Companies that advertise generally try to achieve one of several objectives, all of which
are meant to encourage or induce the customer to make a purchase. The trial objective encourages
customers to make an initial purchase of a product or service. The continuity objective is intended to
retain current customers and build loyalty. Brand switching seeks to have a customer change from a
competitor’s brand; non-dominant companies in a field often have this objective. The switchback
objective seeks to regain lost customers by emphasizing new features or other important
information. Id.; see also ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BUSINESS, supra note 327, at 6.
331. SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 1, at 130.
332. John R. Hewitt, Advertising and Communications, in BROKER-DEALER REGULATION
§ 7:2.1, 76 (Clifford E. Kirsch ed., 2011).
333. Advertising regulation covers content standards, disclosure requirements, filing
requirements, and review methods. See generally id. §§ 7.1–7.2, at 7-1 to 7-44.
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Advertising works. According to research in the field of emotional
advertising, one can develop positive beliefs about a subject’s attributes
merely by having a positive emotional reaction to an advertisement.334
Emotions such as “warmth” can relax the viewer and put him in a
positive state of mind. Warmth can be stimulated by pictures or by
narratives of friendship, caring, and tenderness.335 These feelings may be
engendered through brokerage advertisements discussed above,
particularly those suggesting that brokerage employees will provide
trust, guidance, advice, answers, and help.336 Researchers have found
that advertisements that evoke feelings of warmth are correlated with the
likelihood of purchase.337 As discussed above, use of titles such as
“financial advisor” and “financial consultant” appears to affect investors,
with investors viewing financial advisors and financial consultants as
more similar to investment advisers than to brokers in terms of the
services offered and duties imposed.338
b.

Advertisements Are Intended to Be Believed

One response to the argument that advertising and titles induce
customers to engage a particular brokerage firm is that advertising
language is not meant to be taken literally; the language is mere
puffery.339 Under the puffery doctrine, words such as “trust,” “advice,”
and “trusted advice” are not meant to be believed as actually true. For
example, no one would think that the phrase “best cheesesteaks in
Philadelphia” is the result of a proprietor’s survey. Instead, the phrase is
mere puffery.
Puffery is a spurious objection here. First, it is unlikely that the
brokerage industry would argue that use of advertisements proposing
advice, and titles such as “financial advisor” or “financial consultant,”
334. Julie A. Edell, Emotion in Advertising: A Timely Union, in EMOTION IN ADVERTISING:
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL EXPLORATIONS xiv (Stuart J. Agres et al. eds., 1990).
335. GERARD J. TELLIS, EFFECTIVE ADVERTISING: UNDERSTANDING WHEN, HOW, AND WHY
ADVERTISING WORKS 171 (2004).
336. Some financial services firms employ language of trust in their advertisements to create a
particular mood, image, or emotion. Similarly, by differentiating “answers” from “sales talk,” which
was done in one of the advertisements mentioned above, see supra Part III.A., brokers shed their
historical role as securities salesmen and promoted an image that they provide impartial advice. See
supra Part III.A.; see also supra note 273 and accompanying text.
337. See David A. Aaker et al., Warmth in Advertising: Measurement, Impact, and Sequence
Effects, 12 J. OF CONSUMER RES. 365, 378 (1986).
338. See supra Part III.A.
339. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 606–09 (6th
ed. 2009); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 723 (4th ed. 1971).
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are acceptable expressly because no one would actually believe them at
face value. Moreover, there is evidence that consumers consistently view
puffery statements as important when making decisions.340 This
evidence is consistent with the Rand Report, which suggests that people
believe their brokers are acting in their best interest.341
A second response is that even if the words in an advertisement are
taken as true, the general rule is that an advertisement is not an offer.342
There are two reasons for this rule. First, an advertisement is general; it
is not clear to whom it is directed and there is no limitation on the
number of persons who could accept it. Second, an advertisement is
merely a notice of available goods or services and acts as an invitation to
examine, negotiate, and buy.343
Recent scholarship debunks the shibboleth that an advertisement is
not an offer. Legal scholars Jay Feinman and Steven Brill point to three
reasons why the rule is wrong: (i) the cases that cite this rule do not
apply it, (ii) other legal rules, such as statutes and regulations, prevent
application of the rule, and (iii) the rule is inconsistent with fundamental
tenets of contract law.344 In light of this analysis, there are strong reasons
to believe that advertisements in some cases might be considered offers.
Regardless of whether or not an advertisement can be considered an
offer, an advertisement under agency law could be considered a
manifestation by a principal to a third party (a customer) that a brokerdealer registered representative is acting in a fiduciary capacity, giving
rise to reasonable expectations regarding the conduct of a broker-dealer
firm. Again, the point is not that any one broker-dealer should be liable
because of a particular advertisement or use of a title, but rather that
broker-dealers that give advice should be subject to a general fiduciary
duty because of the reasonable expectations they have created.
C.

Brokers’ Claim to Provide Advice Results in a Fiduciary Promise

The argument to this point has been that use of advertisements and
titles with advice language creates a reasonable expectation that broker340. See David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1395, 1434–39
(2006).
341. RAND REPORT, supra note 84, at 109.
342. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 26 cmt. b (1981) (“Advertisements of
goods . . . are not ordinarily intended or understood as offers to sell.”); see also CORBIN, supra note
295, § 2.4, at 116 (stating that it is not “customary” that an advertisement is an offer and the
presumption is the other way).
343. Feinman & Brill, supra note 298, at 63–64.
344. Id. at 65–80.
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dealer firms provide advice to retail customers. The provision of advice
alone, however, may not give rise to a fiduciary duty. This section
explains why a broker-dealer’s promise to advise another results in a
promise to do so in an impartial manner, consistent with the other’s best
interest—a fiduciary standard.
1.

Advising Another Implies Advising Impartially

One might begin by asking what it means to “advise” another. To
advise is to give guidance or suggestions, to state one’s opinion as to the
best course of action, to counsel or make recommendations, typically as
a basis for another to make a decision.345 A key element of this
definition is to give guidance on the best course of action. Implicit in the
term “advise” is that the guidance given will be the best guidance for the
recipient of the advice, tantamount to a best interest standard.
To clarify what is meant by “advise,” one might contrast it with the
term “persuade,” which is to urge someone successfully to do
something: to attract, induce, or entice in a particular direction.346 Both
advising and persuading entail giving another reasons to undertake a
particular course of action. An important difference, however, is that
advising does not necessarily entail trying to convince another to change
her conduct and follow a recommended course of action. To advise is to
set forth a course of action for another. Even if the speaker believes the
recipient should follow the course of action, the decision is left to the
recipient and the speaker remains neutral.347 By contrast, persuasion
connotes a speaker’s desire for a particular outcome.
An adviser’s impartiality is implicit in the profession and the hallmark
of adviser regulation. As discussed above, before the investment
advisory profession developed, investors sought advice from their

345. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 271, available at http://www.oed.com/
view/Entry/3001?redirectedFrom=advise#eid.
346. Id., available at http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/141561?rskey=clv4LK&result=
2&isAdvanced=false#eid.
347. The etymology of advice sheds light on the distinction. Advice can be traced to the French
avis. The old French expression il m’est a vis meant “it is to me at sight” or “it is my view or
opinion.” F. Max Müller, How to Work, 65 ECLECTIC MAG. OF FOREIGN LIT., SCI., & ART 433, 434
(1897) (containing detailed etymology of advice). The French phrase ce m’est à vis became ce m’est
avis meaning “it seems to me.” OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 271, available at
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/2987?redirectedFrom=advice#eid. Similarly, the phrase mon à vis,
meaning “my at sight or my view,” became mon avis, and then, in the Latin of that time, advisum,
derived from ad (to) and visum (seen), or the way in which a matter is seen or looked upon. Müller,
supra, at 434.
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lawyers and other professionals, not from specialists.348 In engaging with
their lawyer, investors believed they were dealing with someone in
whom they could confide their personal circumstances.349 The genesis of
the profession was what Rudolf Berle, General Counsel of the
Investment Counsel Association of America, called a “personal
professional relationship.”350 Individuals turned to their investment
adviser, like their lawyer, as someone they could trust to help them
arrive at a solution to their problems.
As described in Part I, a key concern underlying the Advisers Act was
the presence of tipsters who were disguising themselves as legitimate
advisers.351 There was antipathy by advisers who provided unbiased
advice toward those with a vested interest in recommending a particular
security.352 Leading up to passage of the Advisers Act, Berle lamented
the fact that congressional bills that regulated investment companies and
investment advisers appeared together. As he put it, “Investment counsel
have only services to sell. Investment companies have securities to
sell.”353 Implicit in this distinction was that investment counsel would
advise in a client’s best interest whereas other securities professionals
were trying to make a sale.354
2.

A Claim of Impartiality Results in a Fiduciary Duty

When one advises another, he is purporting to provide independent,
impartial information in the best interest of the recipient. This is
common sense. When a student seeks enrollment advice from an
academic counselor, the student has a reasonable expectation that the
counselor will advise based on the student’s best interest and not on
other considerations, such as which classes the school must fill or which
348. See supra Part I.A.
349. Hearings on S. 3580, supra note 64, Part 2 at 750 (statement of Rudolf P. Berle, General
Counsel, Investment Counsel Association of America).
350. Id.
351. See supra Part I.B.3.
352. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
353. Berle, supra note 349, at 743.
354. Developments in the European Union reflect this trend. The current draft of the Markets in
Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II) states that investment firms should explain to clients
the reasons for their advice. The draft also states that when providing investment advice on an
independent basis, it is appropriate “to further restrict the possibility for firms to accept or receive
inducements from third parties.” Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on Markets in Financial Instruments Repealing Directive 2004.39.ec of the European
Parliament and of the Council, at 27, COM (2011) 656 final (Oct. 20, 2011), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?CL=en&DosId=200940.
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professors the counselor likes best. According to William Prosser’s
Handbook of The Law of Torts, it is reasonable to rely on an opinion that
is given by one who purports to be disinterested.355 The propensity to
rely on a disinterested adviser is illustrated by a venerable common law
doctrine that distinguishes between advice given by a seller and advice
given by one who holds himself out as disinterested.
The rule of the disinterested adviser dates to the 1800s. In Medbury v.
Watson,356 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that false
statements by a seller of property might not be actionable because a
buyer should be aware of a seller’s motive. A reasonable buyer would
understand that a seller would be inclined towards hyperbole with regard
to the property sold. By contrast, the same false statement made by a
person purporting to be independent would result in liability:
[T]he distinction between the two cases is marked and obvious. In
the one, the buyer is aware of his position; he is dealing with the
owner of the property, whose aim is to secure a good price, and
whose interest it is to put a high estimate upon his estate, and
whose great object is to induce the purchaser to make the
purchase; while in the other, the man who makes the false
assertions has apparently no object to gain; he stands in the
situation of a disinterested person, in the light of a friend, who has
no motive nor intention to depart from the truth, and who thus
throws the vendee off his guard, and exposes him to be misled by
the deceitful representations.357
The Court distinguished a seller, whose role is transparent to the buyer
and whose advice should be taken with a grain of salt, from another
person who appears to be disinterested, which causes the buyer to let his
guard down, exposing him to misrepresentations.
Modern courts express a similar principle: an adviser that holds itself
out as an expert assumes fiduciary obligations. In Burdett v. Miller,358 an
unsophisticated investor, Burdett, formed a relationship with a
stockbroker, Miller, who was also a certified public accountant, a
professor of accounting, and the owner of his own accounting firm.359
The two became friendly, occasionally having lunch and discussing
business and personal matters. Burdett hired Miller to prepare her tax
355. PROSSER, supra note 339, at 727.
356. 47 Mass. (6 Met.) 246 (1843).
357. Id. at 260; see also Batchfelder v. Stephenson, 184 N.W. 852, 852–53 (Minn. 1921); Samp
v. Long, 210 N.W. 733, 734–35 (S.D. 1926).
358. 957 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1992).
359. Id. at 1378–79.
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return and several years later sought his advice on how to invest to
minimize her tax liability. Miller recommended that she invest in a
number of tax shelters, but he failed to disclose conflicts of interest in
making the recommendation and other relevant facts—such as the lack
of an investment track record and the lack of liquidity. Burdett invested
based on Miller’s advice and lost $200,000.360 Burdett sued, alleging that
Miller, among other things, breached his fiduciary duty.361
In Miller, Judge Richard Posner wrote that if a person solicits another
to trust him in matters for which he holds himself out as expert and
trustworthy, and if the other, who is not an expert, accepts the offer and
reposes her trust in the first, a fiduciary relationship is established.362
Thus, by holding oneself out as a disinterested adviser, a broker-dealer
must act in the customer’s best interest, disclosing conflicts of interest
and recommending the best investment among alternatives.363
The claim of impartiality for advisers played an essential role in
Supreme Court jurisprudence governing investment advisers, discussed
above.364 In SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., the Court held
that a practice known as scalping—buying shares for the adviser’s own
account and then recommending the same shares to clients—operated as
a fraud and deceit on clients.365 The Court explained that when an
adviser trades on the market effect of his own recommendation, he might
be motivated to recommend the security to take advantage of a shortterm increase in price, and an investor should be permitted to evaluate an
adviser’s “overlapping motivations.”366 The dissent in the Second Circuit
360. Id. at 1379.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 1381; see also EBC I, Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 832 N.E.2d 26, 31 (N.Y. 2005)
(holding that when an arm’s length relationship becomes advisory and one person was induced to
and did repose confidence in another, the relationship becomes fiduciary).
363. The holding-out argument is not the same as the shingle theory. See supra Part II.C.2. The
shingle theory refers to the implicit statement by a broker, which hangs a shingle, that it will
conduct business in an equitable and professional manner. See supra note 82 and accompanying
text. The shingle theory holds that when a broker sells a security, it warrants that statements
regarding the security are correct. The broker, therefore, has an obligation of due diligence to ensure
its statements are correct. If the broker conceals information that is inconsistent with its statements,
the concealment may be considered fraudulent. See HAZEN, supra note 30, at 608; Hazen, Are
Existing Stock Broker Standards Sufficient? Principles, Rules, and Fiduciary Duties, supra note 19,
at 751–52. The claim of reasonable expectations applies more expansively to the relationship
between the broker and the customer than the shingle theory, establishing a reasonable expectation
not only that the broker’s statements regarding a particular security are correct, but also that the
broker will more generally act in the customer’s best interest.
364. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
365. Id. at 181.
366. Id. at 196.
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Court of Appeals, which presaged the majority decision in the Supreme
Court, focused on the appearance of objectivity and the importance such
appearance would have to an investor:
Here Capital Gains held itself out as an investment adviser and
stated that the service was exclusively designed to help clients
protect investment capital, realize income, and accumulate capital
gains. It thus naturally instilled in its clients the belief that it
would render impartial and unbiased expert advice. Having taken
this fiduciary stance, it then secretly engaged in profitable trading
operations often inconsistent with its own advice . . . . Failure to
disclose the existence of such a motive in the light of the implicit
and explicit guaranty of impartiality was a scheme to defraud and
operated as a fraud upon the clients.367
The Supreme Court majority adopted this theme, noting that affiliations
by advisory firms with banks or corporations might preclude a
“disinterested, objective, or critical” perspective regarding an
investment.368
Recalling that the Advisers Act was meant to address “tipster” firms
masquerading as bona fide investment advisers illustrates that Congress
and the SEC have returned to where they started in 1940. The Advisers
Act was passed out of concern that certain individuals or firms were
masquerading as advisers without providing impartial advice. Today, the
same tension animates the debate over whether to impose a fiduciary
duty on brokers that give advice. Absent a fiduciary duty for brokers that
give advice, the concern remains that brokers that are paid to sell
securities, or that have other conflicts of interest, are masquerading as
objective investment advisers, even though they are not regulated as
such.369 As one expert stated when testifying in support of a fiduciary
standard, “the key characteristic that distinguishes advice from a sales
pitch is that it is designed with the recipient’s interest in mind.”370
D.

Regulatory and Common Law Consequences Follow from
Investors’ Reasonable Expectations of a Fiduciary Obligation
The use of advertising and titles laden with the language of advice has

367. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 306 F.2d 606, 617 (2d Cir. 1962) (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
368. Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 187–88 (quoting H.R. DOC. NO. 76-477, 29 (1939)).
369. See Susanne Craig & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Conflict Seen In Sales Tactic at JPMorgan,
N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2012, at A1.
370. Roper, supra note 177, at 6.
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consequences in both regulatory law and common law. The regulatory
consequence is that customers’ reasonable expectations that brokers act
in a fiduciary capacity can form the basis for a new fiduciary rule for
broker-dealers under Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Act. The common
law consequence is that courts can look to the reasonable expectations of
investors in determining whether broker-dealers that give personalized
advice to retail customers should be held to a fiduciary standard.
1.

Reasonable Expectations Support a New Fiduciary Duty Under the
Dodd-Frank Act

In the Section 913 Study, the SEC staff’s primary recommendation is
that the Commission “should engage in rulemaking to implement the
uniform fiduciary standard of conduct for broker-dealers and investment
advisers when providing personalized investment advice about securities
to retail customers.”371 According to the Study, a uniform standard
should require that all brokers, dealers, and advisers, when providing
personalized advice, “act in the best interest of the customer without
regard to the financial or other interest of the broker, dealer, or
investment adviser providing the advice.”372 Insofar as brokers advertise
themselves as advisers, thereby inducing customers to use their services,
brokers are raising reasonable expectations that they will act in a
fiduciary capacity. Moreover, brokers’ advertisements focus on giving
personalized advice, which was Congress’ precise concern in Section
913 of the Dodd-Frank Act. As a result, regulators have a basis for
imposing a fiduciary duty on brokers that give advice.
Under this analysis, brokers would still be excluded from the
Advisers Act if their advice was solely incidental to brokerage and they
did not charge special compensation for advice. Broker-dealers that give
personalized advice to retail customers will not be subject to the
Advisers Act in its entirety. The SEC would maintain discretion to
determine when advice is so significant that it cannot be considered
solely incidental to brokerage.
One example of where advice would probably not be solely incidental
to brokerage is when a broker has discretion over an account. When the
SEC adopted the exemptive rule in 2005, it determined that discretionary
advice could no longer be considered “solely incidental” to brokerage.
Broker-dealers would not be excluded from the Advisers Act for
discretionary accounts, regardless of the form of compensation received.
371. SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 1, at 109.
372. Id. at 109–10.
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According to the SEC, authority to effect a trade without consulting a
client is “qualitatively distinct” from providing advice that is “solely
incidental” to brokerage. The SEC explained that when a broker has
discretion, the broker is both the source of the advice and the person
with the authority to carry it out. This type of activity is “quintessentially
supervisory or managerial” and warrants protections provided by the
Advisers Act.373 Decisions such as these would be left to the SEC to
resolve through rulemaking, interpretation, and enforcement cases.
Under a new rule, however, an overarching fiduciary obligation would
apply across the board to broker-dealers that provide personalized advice
to retail customers.
2.

Reasonable Expectations Support a Common Law Fiduciary Duty
for Broker-Dealers That Provide Advice

This Article argues that brokers’ use of advertisements and titles,
which induces customers to obtain advice from brokerage firms, along
with changes in the brokerage industry, creates a reasonable expectation
that brokers providing advice are fiduciaries and must act in customers’
best interest. This in itself creates a legal basis for holding broker-dealers
to a fiduciary standard when those brokers provide advice. As a result, if
an action were brought by a brokerage customer against a firm for
breach of fiduciary duty in the context of a broker providing advice, a
court could hold that the brokerage firm has breached its fiduciary duty
resulting in a tort. According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a
person in a fiduciary relationship with another is subject to liability for
harm resulting from a breach of duty imposed by the relation.374 In the
context of a broker providing advice, a fiduciary relationship exists and
the duty is imposed by the relation. That is, the duty arises because of
the inducement from the broker’s use of advertising and titles. If harm
has occurred as a result of a breach, the broker would be subject to
liability in tort.
This rule should apply to the category of brokers that provide
personalized advice to retail customers. This category of brokers would
join the group of paradigmatic relationships, such as trustee and
beneficiary, guardian and ward, and attorney and client, all of which are
already subject to a fiduciary obligation.375 Courts would no longer have
373. Adopting Release, supra note 10, at 20,440.
374. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (1979).
375. See Finn, supra note 314, at 32; Ethan J. Leib, Friends as Fiduciaries, 86 WASH. U. L. REV.
665, 671–72 (2009).

Laby - FINAL Word.docx (Do Not Delete)

774

11/1/2012 11:20 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:707

to engage in a case-by case determination regarding whether a brokerdealer that provides advice is a fiduciary.
To say that a court should hold that a fiduciary duty exists and that a
breach of the duty would constitute a tort does not settle what the scope
or contours of the broker’s fiduciary obligation would be. As noted
above, fiduciary duties are ambiguous and the details of the broker’s
fiduciary duty are open to question.376 The duties imposed in a particular
case would likely vary depending on the contract between the brokerage
firm and the customer and other circumstances surrounding the
relationship. A fiduciary’s obligations typically depend on the scope of
the fiduciary’s authority.377 The scope of this authority can vary, even
within a particular brokerage firm. For example, some accounts are
discretionary; others are not.378 Regardless of the particular contours of
the fiduciary obligation, the standard obligations attendant to a fiduciary
relationship would follow: the broker, for example, could not use the
customer’s property, the broker’s position, or any non-public
information acquired as a result of the relationship for the broker’s own
purposes.379 The broker would owe a fiduciary duty to the customer and
breach would constitute a tort.
* * *
Whether a fiduciary relationship is imposed by administrative rule or
common law, one feature of the fiduciary relationship that cannot be
ignored is the ability of the parties in the relationship to change their
rights and responsibilities by contract.380 Although the parties can alter
many obligations attendant to a fiduciary relationship, certain
obligations—such as a core duty of loyalty—cannot be negotiated.381 A
strict duty of loyalty to place the customer’s interest before the firm’s
376. See supra Part II.A.2.
377. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. e (2006).
378. See supra Part III.D.1.
379. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. e.
380. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 90–91 (1989).
381. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. c(2) (2007) (“Even an express
authorization [to engage in prohibited transactions], however, would not completely dispense with
the trustee’s underlying fiduciary obligations to act in the interest of the beneficiaries and to
exercise prudence in administering the trust.”); see also BT-I v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of
the U.S., 75 Cal. App. 4th 1406, 1412 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (“[A] limited partnership agreement
cannot relieve the general partner of its fiduciary duties in matters fundamentally related to the
partnership business.”).
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interest would be etched in the law, whether by rule or case law. Perhaps
more importantly, in the large number of instances when the parties do
not revise terms by contract, default rules governing fiduciary
relationships, developed through centuries of precedent in the common
law, would be applicable to the brokerage relationship.382
CONCLUSION
As the SEC edges closer to imposing a fiduciary duty on brokers that
give advice, it can look to investors’ reasonable expectations as a
justification for doing so. The debate over whether and when to impose a
fiduciary duty on brokers is not new. It has existed in the courts for
decades and took on new dimensions once brokers began to market
themselves as advisers, particularly after the abolition of fixed
commissions. Charging asset-based fees and the development of two
tiers of pricing for brokerage services raised questions over whether
brokers could continue to rely on the broker exclusion from the Advisers
Act. Although the SEC attempted to address this conundrum through
rulemaking, the SEC’s rule was vacated. And although Congress took up
the issue in the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress made no final decisions,
opting to delegate resolution of this thorny problem to the SEC. The
SEC staff has recommended imposing a fiduciary duty on brokers that
give advice, but the SEC has yet to act.
To date, the justifications relied on by those proposing a fiduciary
duty for brokers are not completely convincing. Arguments such as
investor confusion or inconsistent or weak standards are insufficient to
ground a change in the law. Confusion could be addressed by
mechanisms short of a rule change, and the presence of inconsistent or
even weak standards alone does not justify changing them. A better
reason stems from investors’ expectations, though a fiduciary standard is
not supportable based on the empirical expectations of some or even
most investors.
To support a fiduciary duty for brokers, regulators and courts should
look instead to the reasonable expectations of brokerage customers,
formed over years of advertising and use of titles, which project an
image of a broker as a trusted adviser and provide a promise of
rendering advisory services. Inherent in a promise to provide advice is a
promise that the advice will be objective and shorn of conflicts of
interest—the hallmarks of advice given by investment advisers in
382. Cf. Andrew Tuch, Investment Banks as Fiduciaries: Implications for Conflicts of Interest, 29
MELB. U. L. REV. 478, 503 (2005).
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accordance with a fiduciary standard as articulated by the SEC and the
courts. The reasonable expectations of the parties, resulting from
brokers’ use of advertising and titles reflecting an advisory role, provide
a sound justification to change the law to impose on broker-dealers a
fiduciary duty when providing personalized investment advice to retail
customers. The SEC should exercise its authority and impose a fiduciary
duty in this circumstance.

